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CHAPTER r 
THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF THE STUDY
The two countries. East and West Germany, were created out of the 
Third Reich following World War II. At that time Germany was an ad­
vanced and industrialized country. Historically, East Germany was the 
first advanced, industrialized country to implement a socialist, cen­
trally planned economy.
Up to the time of the creation of East Germany one of the major 
problems of comparing the economic performance of socialist and capital­
ist economies— especially the United States and the Soviet Union— was 
that the Soviet Union began central planning as a relatively backward, 
agrarian country. By 1928, when central planning on an economy-wide 
scale began in the Soviet Union, the United States was already a major 
advanced, industrial nation. The problem was essentially comparing 
economies at different stages of economic development.
In looking at post-war East Germany all of the preconditions for 
success of a socialist country existed, e.g., a high percentage of the 
labor force in industry, a low illiteracy rate, and relatively diversi­
fied industries. As a result East Germany’s economic performance should 
be comparable to that of advanced, industrialized capitalist nations.^
^Wolfgang F. Stolper, The Structure of the East German Economy 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp.1-2.
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The best comparison would be with West Germany because prior to 1945 
Germany was a single cultural and economic unit.
The study of the two Germanies provides almost a laboratory case 
for comparing economic performance. Factor endowments were similar for 
both countries. Both countries have abundant supplies of lignite and 
potash. Neither country has high quality iron ore. One major difference 
in resource endowments, however, is that soft coal used for coke in the 
production of steel is concentrated in West Germany. Another difference 
is the fact that West Germany has the Rhine River which allows cheap 
transportation by water compared to the almost exclusive reliance of 
East Germany on rail transportation with its higher costs. Both coun­
tries had highly skilled labor forces, although the distribution of 
skilled labor reflected the distribution of types of coal. Lignite- 
based industries tended to be concentrated in what is now East Germany. 
These industries were electric power oriented and included aluminum and 
magnesium industries, the heavy chemicals, synthetic rubber, and sythetic 
gasoline industries. In addition light industries such as textiles, 
clothing, and precision instruments and optical equipment were concen­
trated in East Germany. Most heavy industry was concentrated in West 
Germany, particularly in the Ruhr River Valley, where abundant quantities 
of cokeable coal are found.^
The basic hypothesis of this study is that there should be little or 
no difference in the industrial performance in the two countries. Any 
observed differences can be accounted for by differences in the politi­
cal-economic systems. The study will focus on industrial performance of
^Ibid., pp. 3-4.
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seventeen industries in each country from 1958 to 1967. One reason for 
confining the study to this time period is that the pre-1958 data for 
West German industry are not comparable to post-1958 data due to the re­
patriation of the Saarland to West Germany by the French in 1957. After 
1958 production and factor statistics for the Saarland are included in 
the output and factor series for West German industry. In East Germany 
a major reorganization of Industry occurred in 1968 in which industrial 
boundaries were extensively redefined.3 The series of industrial statis­
tics from 1968 to the present are thus not comparable to earlier indus­
trial statistics.
The study first concentrates on the general development of indus­
try in the two countries from the end of World War II through 1967 with 
an emphasis on the 1958-1967 time period. East Germany is a centrally 
planned economy which underwent extensive reforms in its industrial plan­
ning system over the ten-year period. The purpose of these reforms was 
to increase the efficiency of the system. The result of the reforms was 
to considerably decentralize the planning system. The role of profits 
was emphasized as well as the allowance of a greater degree of enter­
prise autonomy. West German industry operates in a mixed economic sys­
tem in which the state has considerable influence, but the predominant 
method of allocating resources remains in the hands of the private 
sector.
Comparison of industrial performance centers around estimates of 
the contributions of capital and labor to the growth of output, the rate
^Deutsches Institut fUr Wirtschaftsforschung, DDR Wirtschaft, 
(Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Bucherei, GmbH, 1971), pp.62-63.
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of growth of output, technical change, and the elasticity of substitu­
tion of capital for labor. Analysis takes place within the context of 
the theory of production. The basic assumptions underlying the produc­
tion model are that technical change is Hicks neutral, that the produc­
tion function is homogeneous of degree one and is subject to constant 
returns to scale, and that capital and labor are paid their marginal 
products.
Subject to the above restrictions no particular form of the pro­
duction function is assumed ^  priori. Instead three forms of the pro­
duction function are estimated. Two of these forms, the CES and the 
Cobb-Douglas, require that the elasticity of substitution be constant.
The third, the constant marginal shares (CMS) function, allows for a 
variable elasticity of substitution. The properties of these production 
functions are described in detail in Chapter III.
Except for estimates of the elasticity of substitution, the com­
parative performance of the industries in the two countries is expressed 
in terms of changes and rates of change. No attempt has been made to 
convert the value of output and capital in one country into those of the 
other.^ The reason for not making the conversion stems from the fact 
that in this case very little seems to be gained from dynamic comparisons 
using output and capital valued in one country's prices given the avail­
ability of statistics in the two countries. In a major study prepared 
for the West German government the capital stock of East Germany was
**See Herbert Wilkins, "Labor Productivity in East and West German 
Industry," Economic Bulletin, Vol. 7 (June 1970), pp. 53-56 and Federal 
Republic of Germany, Bundesministerium fUr innerdeutsche Beziehungen, 
Bericht der Bundesregierung und Materialien zur Lage der Nation 1971 
(Kassel: A. G. Wenderoth, 1971), Chapter V, for a discussion of this
method.
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simply multiplied by 0.8 to convert it into West German prices while 
East German output was converted for only one year and then assumed to 
change at the same rate as gross production.^ One problem stems from 
the fact that no index of net production or value added is available 
from the East German authorities, and no index of gross output or value 
added is available from the West German authorities. The conclusion is 
that while such procedures might be useful for static comparisons, they 
make little difference in dynamic comparisons. This study is concerned 
more with the direction of change over time than with comparisons at any 
given time. Some static concepts such as the capital-output ratios are 
used, but again the principal concern is with the direction in which they 
are moving since rising or falling capital-output ratios are one indica­
tor of the trend of capital productivity.
^Federal Republic of Germany, Bundesministerium fUr innerdeutsche 
Beziehungen, Bericht und Materialien, pp. 106-107. See also Appendix B 
for a detailed discussion of the method of converting the East German 
output series.
CHAPTER II
EAST AND WEST GERMAN INDUSTRY
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the industries to be 
compared and to examine the organization of industry in the two Ger­
manies. East Germany has a socialist, centrally planned economy. East 
Germany altered its industrial planning system in 1963 from a version of 
the Stalinist model to what Campbell has called a cartelized planning 
system, i.e., one in which much of the planning is done by intermediate 
agencies between the firm and the higher level of bureaucratic author­
ities.^ The West German economy cannot be said to be a pure market 
economy because of the large economic role played by government which 
includes either full or partial government ownership of the major firms 
in the economy.
All definitions of industrial boundaries are made according to East 
German classifications because of the higher degree of aggregation com­
pared to those of West Germany.^ One major industry in both countries, 
vehicle manufacturing, has been omitted because of a significant change
^Robert Campbell, "Economic Reform in the U. S. S. R . American 
Economic Review 58 (May 1968), pp. 556-557.
^The method of comparing East and West German industries is given 
in Appendix A.
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in the definition of this industry in 1964 by the East German authorities. 
In 1964 about one-fourth of the workers in this industry were transferred 
to the state railways.^ Pre-1964 series on this industry are thus not
comparable to post-1964 series. Seventeen industries are compared in 
this study; they are mining, metallurgy, chemicals, building materials, 
electrotechnical, shipbuilding, machinery, metal goods, precision instru­
ments and optical equipment, woodworking, textiles, clothing, leather 
goods, pulp and paper, polygraphic, glass and ceramics, and food indus­
tries .
East German Industry 
The command economy in Germany dates from World War I. It became a 
permanent feature of the economy in Germany under the Nazis in the 1930's 
and continued practically unaltered after 1945 in the Soviet Occupation 
Zone. The importance of this fact needs to be stressed for an under­
standing of the East German economy. Managers and workers were quite 
familiar with a command system at the end of World War II. There was no 
need, therefore, to impose a centrally planned system on the Germans in 
the Eastern Zone with the attendant disruptions of production. The Soviet 
authorities of course expropriated most of the private owners of industry 
and eliminated the top management of firms who had been closely associa­
ted with the former Nazi regime, but the major planning apparatus remain­
ed intact. The major features of the central planning system of the Nazi 
regime— central control of resources and allocation of these resources
^German Democratic Republic, Staatlichen Zentralverwaltung filr Stat- 
istik, Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republlk 1965, 
(East Berlin: Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1965),
p. 97 (hereafter cited as SJBDDR followed by date).
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according to political rather than economic considerations, rationing, 
and centrally controlled prices— remained in force. The reasons for 
this retention of the command economy with the underlying reliance on 
pre-war managers and technicians were that the ideology of the Soviet 
Union favored central planning and that not enough reliable German com­
munists existed to replace the existing managers. Indeed the German 
people as a whole were considered ideologically unreliable by the Sov­
iets.**
Until 1950 the basic Nazi command system was retained with few al­
terations. In 1950 the State Planning Commission was created. From 1953 
to 1963 the East German planning system was closely patterned after that 
of the U. S. S. R.^ The planning system both before and after the intro­
duction of the State Planning Commission was geared to war reparations to 
the Soviet Union. The rapid recovery of the East German economy was nec­
essary from the Soviet point of view for war reparations. Estimates of 
the degree of exploitation of the East German economy from 1945 to 1953 
by the Soviet Occupation authorities amount to about 25 percent of GNP 
in each year.® This should be compared with the high levels of recovery 
aid given to West Germany under the Marshall Plan. After the uprisings 
in 1953 the Soviets ended their war reparations policy, and East Germany 
slowly began to become just another of the Soviet satellite countries
**Radoslav Selucky, Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1972), pp. 57-58.
®Gustav Stolper, Karl Hauser, and Knut Borchart, The German Economy: 
1870 to the Present (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1967),
p. 310.
®Wolfgang Stolper, The Structure of the East German Economy (Cam­
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 5.
rather than an occupied zone. By 1957 the burden of Soviet occupation 
costs paid by East Germany was sharply reduced, and an emphasis was laid 
on expanding the economy, especially consumer goods production. With 
the enormous war burdens eliminated and occupation costs reduced, the 
East German economy was ready to begin operation primarily for domestic 
needs. Finally by 1957 the reconstruction of the economy had been large­
ly completed.7
During the period 1958 to 1967 the East German planning system un­
derwent a major reorganization beginning in 1963. Figure 1 shows the 
planning apparatus which existed from 1958 to 1963. Not shown in the 
formal planning organization chart is the place of the East German Soc­
ialist Unity Party or SED (Socialist Einheitspartei Deutschland). Plan­
ning objectives were set out by the Politbureau and Central Committee of 
the SED. These objectives were passed to the Council of Ministers (Min- 
isterrat) and then to the State Planning Commission® which coordinated 
these directives with the Economic Council.® The State Planning Commis­
sion initially prepared what are called prospective plans for several 
years as well as the annual plan. The National Economic Council (VWR 
or VolkswirtschaftsrHte) coordinated the annual plans of the State Plan­
ning Commission and the directives of the Council of Ministers into dir­
ectives for industry. In the VWR there were specialized industrial
^Selucky, Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe, pp. 69-70.
®Stolper, et al.. The German Economy, p. 313.
®Klaus Wagenknecht, "Zusammenstellung der Reformen im Plannungs- 
und Leitungssystem der DDR: 1950-1969," paper presented at Free Univer­
sity, Berlin, 1972. (Mimeographed) p. 3.
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FIGURE 1. Industrial planning system in East Germany from 1958 to
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ministries prior to 1958.
The planning process now passed downward to the Regional Economic 
Councils (BezirkswirtschaftsrUte or BWR's) and to the Associations of 
People Owned Works (Volkseignigung Volkseigener Betrieben or WB's).
The BWR's along with the respective regional governments then passed 
the plan targets to the District Economic Departments (Wirtschafts 
Abteilungen des Kreise). Finally the enterprises under their control 
received their plans. The other line of command went from the VVB's 
to the enterprises under them.^l The enterprises now had to indicate 
what they needed to fulfill their plans to the appropriate authorities, 
and the planning procedure went into reverse. Clearly it was in the 
best interest of each enterprise to get as low a plan as possible. The 
same held true for each District Economic Council, BWR, and W B. There 
apparently therefore was the problem of the overordering of materials 
and the hiding of capacity. The top planning agencies found it necessary 
to implement strict controls which were not always too effective. In 
1958 a reform of the system was begun which ultimately led to the so- 
called New Economic System (NES) in 1963.^^ In 1961 the VWR and State 
Planning Commission were m e r g e d . T h i s  merger would appear to be little 
more than a reorganization at the top. The really significant changes 
were to be found at the enterprise level. A great deal of the detailed 
planning was abandoned, and the enterprises were allowed more freedom to
l°Ibid., p. 3. 
l^Ibid., pp. 3-4
l^Stolper, et al., The German Economy, pp. 312-313. 
^^Wagenknecht, "Zusammenstellung der Reformen," p. 3.
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determine their own share of the plan. More importantly, enterprises 
were allowed to establish contracts with each other directly rather than 
through planning apparatus and could sue one another for non-payment of 
bills, non-delivery of ordered materials, or delivery of the wrong type 
of materials.]^ While planning was largely done in terms of physical 
units by the method of material balances, the economy was a monetary 
one. It was thus not only necessary for the State Planning Commission 
to balance the inputs needed after the enterprises made known their in­
put needs, but also to plan financial flows. The financial plan was 
used as a method of controlling the physical material plan.^^
In 1963 the NES was instituted. There were eight major points in 
the reform. The number of plan targets was reduced. The W B ’s were 
given considerable authority in the planning process. Profit became 
the major success criterion. Enterprises were given greater authority 
in sales and input procurement. Certain enterprises were allowed to 
conduct their own export transactions. A price reform was begun in
1964. Capital charges were introduced. Finally formulation of the plan 
was decentralized with a leading role being played by the VVB’s.
The East German W B  is similar to a trust or cartel. They were 
first established in 1958 after the abolition of the industrial minis­
tries. Prior to 1963 the VVB’s were simply an administrative unit.
After 1963 they became economic units entrusted with investment, sales, 
and export goals. In 1965 the industrial ministries were re-established
l^stolper, et al., The German Economy, p. 313.
ISibid.
^^Selucky, Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe, pp.61-62.
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and the WB's were subordinated to them.l? The WB's however retained 
much of the ministries' functions after 1965. They are empowered to 
develop plans for their member enterprises; to determine prices subject 
to the control authorities' approval; to conduct research and develop­
ment; to sell the output of subordinate enterprises under them; to man­
age the enterprises under them; to make production responsive to con­
sumer demand within limits; and to determine most investments. The 
WB ' s  are however subject to control by the central authorities when 
certain major investments are made.IB
Clearly the degree of decentralization had been significant.
WB's are semiautonomous nonstate organs for economic management.
There was a significant transfer of authority from state organs (minis­
tries) to non-state organs (WB's). Obviously however the nature of 
the centrally planned economy has not been significantly changed because 
the enterprises did not gain autonomy. They are still subordinated to 
the WB's which are themselves subordinated to the industrial ministries. 
The WB's however are based on financial principles rather than on phys­
ical output principles. They are also largely responsible for the entre­
preneurial functions, e.g., control of enterprise profits for invest­
ments and innovation. Since profits became the major success criterion, 
the economic decisions are based on price-cost considerations. Although 
in principle all decisions are based on optimizing the central plan, 
there is evidence that WB's respond at least to a degree to demand, since
^^Martin Schnitzer, East and West Germany; A Comparative Economic 
Analysis (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 230.
IBSelucky, Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe, pp. 61-62.
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TABLE 2-1
CAPITAL-OUTPUT RATIOS IN EAST GERMAN INDUSTRY: 1958, 1963, 1968
Industry 1958 1963 1967
Mining 5.55 7.70 9.60
Metallurgy 3.35 2.97 3.26
Chemicals 3.15 2.62 2.48
Building materials 3.86 4.28 3.81
Electrotechnical 1.06 0.87 0.85
Shipbuilding 2.06 1.71 1.42
Machinery 2.00 1.51 1.48
Metal goods 1.72 1.38 1.24
Precision instruments 
and optical equipment 1.45 1.14 1.01
Woodworking 1.79 1.50 1.46
Textiles 2.28 2.20 2.06
Clothing 0.42 0.45 0.46
Leather goods 1.89 1.61 1.42
Pulp and paper 4.50 4.72 4.36
Polygraphic 1.68 1.77 1.71
Glass and ceramics 2.72 2.53 2.62
Food industries 1.99 1.86 1.71
SOURCE: Appendix Tables B-6 and C-4.
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profits are made on actual sales. In addition the reforms tied prem­
ium funds for bonuses to economic performance (i.e., profits). In 
theory at least this should encourage both enterprises and WB's to 
operate at optimum levels rather than to conceal reserve capacity.
The introduction of capital charges was clearly designed to 
eliminate overordering of capital goods. The introduction of largely 
self-financed investment was also designed for the same purpose. The 
central authorities hoped that such measures would increase the effec­
tiveness of investments that were made and help overcome the rising 
capital-output ratio.^0 In Table 2-1 the capital-output ratios for 
1958, 1963, and 1967 are shown for each of the seventeen industries.
The reforms began in 1958 culminating in the introduction of the NES 
in 1963. The NES was then modified and extended over the next four 
years. In the cases of mining, building materials, pulp and paper, 
polygraphic, and clothing, the capital-output ratio rose between 1958 
and 1963. After 1963 the capital-output ratio began falling in all but 
the mining, polygraphic, and clothing industries. A relationship of 
more interest however is the incremental capital-output ratio which 
measures the effect on output of new capital formation. Table 2-2 
shows the incremental capital-output ratios from 1958 to 1963 and from 
1963 to 1967 for the seventeen industries. These are based on changes 
in gross capital stock and changes in gross output. They show a some­
what different picture of the effectiveness of investment when compared 
to the simple capital-output ratios. As a general statement heavy
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Leather goods 0.82 0.54
Pulp and paper 3.97 3.03
Polygraphic 2.13 1.39
Glass and ceramics 2.06 2.91
Food industries 1.30 0.90
SOURCE: Appendix Tables B-6 and C-4.
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industry shows a rise in the incremental capital-output ratios while 
light industry shows declining incremental capital-output ratios. Ap­
parently the reforms only partially accomplished one goal which was to 
increase the effectiveness of investment. A probable explanation of 
the poorer performance of heavy industry is that East Germany is a rel­
atively resource poor country. In pre-war Germany heavy industry based 
largely on soft coal was located in the Ruhr and in the Upper Silesian 
Basin now a part of Poland. Traditionally East Germany was a major 
producer of precision instruments, optical equipment, textiles, cloth­
ing, printed materials, and office machinery. Heavy industry was large­
ly confined to industrial chemicals.
The problem faced by East Germany was that it has only two major 
types of natural resources, lignite or brown coal and potash. East Ger­
many is the world's largest lignite producer. Lignite as an energy base 
is a relatively inferior material compared to hard coal, oil, or natural 
gas because of low caloric content. It also has a high moisture content 
making it expensive to transport. Lignite is however a good raw mater­
ial for the chemical industry. The incremental capital-output ratio for 
mining shows the increasing difficulty of producing additional lignite. 
While 92 percent of East Germany's lignite is mined by open pit methods, 
increasingly large amounts of overburden must be removed per ton of lig­
nite mined. In an economy based on lignite this fact must affect the 
development of heavy industry as evidenced by the metallurgical industry 
which must use lignite brickettes specially prepared for coking or
^^Wolfgang Stolper, Structure of East German Economy, p. 4.
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22imported coal of coking quality.
The structure of the planning system by 1967 is set out in 
Figure 2. This system embodies the major changes made in the planning 
system from 1963 to 1967. As can be seen, the system was more decen­
tralized than the 1958-1963 system. The State Planning Commission 
and industrial ministries were now more concerned with the longer 
term or so-called prospective plans. The intermediate agencies—  
especially the WB's— were more concerned with the annual plan. In
fact the WB' s  were even given responsibility for balancing, subject
23
to approval from the higher agencies.
There remains to be discussed the various types of enterprises.
These are the combine (Kombinat), the private enterprises, semistate 
enterprises (Halbstaatliche Betrieben), the production cooperatives 
(PGH's or Produktionsgenossenschaften des Handels), and the state 
enterprises (VEB's or Volkseigene Betrieben). Ideologically there is 
a strange mixture of ownership forms, but all are subordinated to the 
central planning structure. Table 2-3 indicates the relative impor­
tance of state-owned enterprises including the combines, PGH's, 
private firms, and semistate enterprises in East German industry. As 
can be seen, state-owned enterprises or VEB's produced the bulk of indus­
trial output. In particular the state-owned enterprises under central 
direction, i.e., state-owned (z), which are subordinated to the WB's, 
dominate industrial production. Since the reforms of 1963 the WB's have
22
Eugene Keefe, et al.. Area Handbook for East Germany (Washington,
D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 240-241.
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1971, p. 61.
FIGURE 2. Industrial planning system in East Germany in 1967.
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TABLE 2-3








Share of Gross Industrial Output
Type of Enterprise 1958 1963 1967
State-owned (z) 86.1 68.2 71.5
State-owned (b) 17.2 13.0
PGH 2.6 2.3 2.3
Privately-owned 8.1 2.7 2.3
Semistate-owned 3.2 9.6 10.9
SOURCE: Staatlichen Zentralverwaltung für Statistik, Statistlsches
Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1968 (East Berlin: 
Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republic, 1968), p. 117; Sta- 
tistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1962, pp. 282- 
283; Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1964, 
p. 93.
had an advisory role in planning for the other types of enterprises 
through the production planning groups as shown in Figure 2. The de­
gree of control of the WB's over enterprises not directly under them 
is not very clear. It is known, however, that the WB's were respon­
sible for translating the general production directives of the State 
Planning Commission and ministries into enterprise plans for those en­
terprises directly subordinate to them.^**
The combine is a major type of state-owned enterprise which may be
Z^Schnitzer, East and West Germany, p. 230.
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subordinate to either a W B  or a Regional Economic Council. It is simi­
lar to a vertically integrated corporation in the West in that enter­
prises which join a combine lose their status as legally independent en­
tities. The basic reason for the formation of combines was economies of 
scale. The East German authorities believed that substantial increases 
in efficiency could be attained by the merger of certain types of enter­
prises. Each enterprise in a combine is evaluated on the basis of its 
plan fulfillment whether its output is to be sold to the combine or to
outside enterprises.25
Production cooperatives (PGH’s) are post-1958 creations. They are 
for craftsmen and artisans. Starting in 1958 considerable pressure was 
put on private craftsmen and artisans to join PGH’s. The ostensible 
reason was economies of scale of larger operations when individual 
craftsmen and artisans’ activities are combined in large workshops. In 
addition the state provides financial, marketing, and technical services 
for PGH’s. The ultimate goal appears to be to eliminate the private 
artisan and craftsman. To accomplish this goal the state uses tax dis­
crimination against private artisans and craftsmen and raises their pro­
duction targets each year. Cooperatives are concentrated in eight occu­
pations: Carpentry, plumbing, painting, electricians, shoemaking,
watchmaking, auto mechanics, and television repairing. A craftsman must 
contribute his tools and about 1000 Ost Marks to join a cooperative. 
While net profits are divided up at the end of each year, a member is 
also liable for losses of his PGH. The management of a PGH is elected 
by secret ballot, and all major decisions affecting the PGH must be
25ibid., p. 234.
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approved by two-thirds of the m e m b e r s . T o  what extent the management 
is freely elected without SED interference is not known.
The state enterprise (VEB) is a legal entity engaged in production. 
This definition would include combines. Unlike its Soviet counterpart 
the VEB's major objective is its profit target which is the major cri­
terion for evaluating an enterprise's economic performance.2? Other 
objectives or targets relate to investment, the assortment of output, 
quality, and physical output. These are usually planned by the enter­
prise and its VVB or Regional Economic Council. Unlike the Soviet
system, the exact plan for an enterprise is based partly on market re­
search and a definite market strategy.^8 The reason for the develop­
ment of a market strategy is simple. The VEB's must arrange to buy 
and sell from each other. They do not go through the planning appar­
atus. Indeed VEB's have the authority to sue each other for violation 
of contracts.29
Profits are important to the VEB because profits and incentive pay­
ments are closely linked. It is clearly in the interest of the VEB and
by implication the W B  to maximize profits. Before continuing, care 
must be taken to emphasize that planning is the motivating force in 
production. The general targets set out by the top planning authorit­
ies must be met. Generally 20 percent of profits after deductions
ZGibid., p. 234.
27lbid., pp. 234-235.
^^Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Berlin, DDR Wirt- 
schaft (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Bucherei, 1971), p. 67 (hereafter
author cited as DIW).
29gtolper, et al., The German Economy, pp. 313-314.
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(i.e., profits taxes) are paid to the state and go into the incentive 
fund.
For profits and profit targets to be meaningful, prices had to be 
reformed. Prior to 1964 prices were based on 1945 prices which were 
unrealistically low in many cases. Many raw materials were subsidized 
out of the state b u d g e t . O b v i o u s l y  for the period 1958-1963 prices 
bore little relationship to true cost or scarcity conditions. Profits 
during this period would clearly be accidental. In 1964 a major price 
reform was begun in which prices were generally raised. First, capital 
asset prices were increased to achieve realistic depreciation costs.
In addition prices for industries producing coal, ores, potash, non- 
ferrous metals, pig iron, and rolling mill products were raised an 
average of 70 percent. In 1965 prices for wood, pulp and paper, leather 
and hides, and chemicals were raised by an average of 40 percent. In 
1967 machinery, some chemicals, and consumer goods were raised by an 
average of 4 percent. This price reform enabled the state to cut sub­
sidies by over 50 percent. Prices were based largely on labor cost plus 
depreciation. Obviously a major problem arose later in that the labor 
intensive industries' prices were too high and the capital intensive in­
dustries' prices were too low. Reforms of the pricing system were con­
tinued after 1 9 6 7 . ^ 2
The agency responsible for prices in East Germany is the Office of 
Prices. It has the final say over prices set by a VEB or a WB. There




are three forms of prices. First, there is the maximum price. A VEB 
or VVB may lower this price subject to approval by the Office of Prices 
if the W B  or VEB is not claiming a state subsidy. Second, buyers and 
sellers are bound by so-called established prices. These may not be 
changed once in force. Indeed these prices tend to remain stable over 
long periods of time and appear to be centrally determined for basic 
materials. Finally, there are contract prices which are negotiated. 
Generally these prices which are worked out between VEB's apply to con­
struction materials, repair work, machinery, and virtually all subcon­
tracting work.33
One problem which one might foresee is that the director of either 
the enterprise or the W B  could act to raise profits in a manner which 
would not be in the best interests of the state. If WB's are similar 
to cartels, why should they not attempt to restrict output if such a re­
striction would result in higher profits? The top East German planning 
authorities set profitability norms. If a profitability norm is exceed­
ed, the enterprise or W B  is supposed to lower prices. If it does not 
have the authority to lower prices, then the W B  or VEB should recommend 
to the Office of Prices that a reduction of the prices is needed.3^
Prior to 1967 it is not clear whether the Office of Prices had the auth­
ority to force the W B  or VEB to lower prices. After 1967 this power is 
more clearly d e f i n e d . 35 in any case there is little incentive to behave
3 3 l b i d . ,  p. 237. 34ibid., p. 238.
35The best discussion of the mechanics of the price reform particu­
larly after 1967 is found in Manfred Meltzer, "Preispolitik und Preis- 
bildung in der DDR," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung, (Drittes 
Heft, January 1969), pp. 313-353. See especially pp. 338-348 for the 
post-1967 methods used in lowering prices.
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monopolistically since any "excess" profits will be wiped out in the 
next planning period by lower prices.
The semistate-owned enterprise involves a mixture of private and
state ownership with the state owning over 50 percent. As with the
cooperatives, the state has put a great deal of pressure on private en­
terprises to permit partial state ownership through tax discrimination 
and limits on the number of employees a private enterprise can employ. 
The share of total industrial output of the semistate enterprises rose 
rapidly between 1958 and 1963 from 3.2 percent in 1958 to 9.6 percent
in 1963. Since 1963 the share has been slowly increasing as shown in
Table 2-3. This relatively small share however does not reflect the 
true importance of the semistate enterprise. In 1963 this type of en­
terprise produced 19.7 percent of the gross output of light industry,3? 
and 21.9 percent in 1967.^® The semistate enterprises are subordinated 
to the Regional Economic Councils, and they are responsible for plans 
passed through the planning apparatus. The state as a part owner sup­
plies capital and receives a share of the profits. The manager who has 
control of the enterprise is usually the owner who receives a salary 
and part of the profits. He is usually not interfered with by the 
authorities as long as he meets planned targets and makes a profit.
The authorities frequently use the unit costs of the semistate enter­
prises as a measure to compare unit costs in state-owned enterprises
®®Schnitzer, East and West Germany, p. 233.
3?SJBDDR 1964, p. 3. (Light industry is made up of the woodworking, 
textiles, clothing, leather goods, pulp and paper, polygraphic, and glass 
and ceramics industries.)
3®SJBDDR 1968, p. 119.
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in similar lines of activity.
East Germany is the only Soviet Bloc country permitting the oper­
ation of private firms. Private enterprises in industry are concen­
trated in light industry and in the food industry.**® In 1967 65.3 
percent of the output of all private firms was concentrated in these 
industries.**^ The state does tolerate this type of enterprise where 
real needs of the population exist for certain types of goods which 
can be produced best by enterprises having considerable skills as 
e.g., fur and leather goods, or which can be produced in small quan­
tities. The tax system is designed to keep private firms small. For 
private entrepreneurs the tax schedules are highly progressive, and 
there is a tax on capital assets which are usually overvalued by the 
authorities for tax purposes. Expansion of the size of the private 
firm is possible but extremely difficult.**^
One problem faced by East Germany is a chronic labor shortage. 
Between 1958 and 1967 the population declined by about 2.4 percent 
compared to a rise in West Germany of 12.1 percent.**^ This decline 
in population can be partially attributed to immigration prior to the 
erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and partially to low birth rates. 
Even more striking is the 10.2 percent decline in the 15-65 year age
3®Schnitzer, East and West Germany, p. 233.
**®Ibid., p. 238.
**̂ SJBDDR 1968, p. 117.
**^Schnitzer, East and West Germany, pp. 238-239.
**^Bundesministerium fUr innerdeutsche Beziehungen, Bericht der 
Bundesregierung und Materialien zur Lage der Nation, 1971 (Kassel: 
A. G. Wendroth, 1971), p. 255.
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group.“*** As a result of this problem there are legal provisions de­
signed to bring women into the labor force. Women with families must 
accept available part-time employment. Widows who are able to work 
may not draw pensions unless their husbands died in industrial acci­
dents or as a result of work-related illnesses. As a result, female 
labor force participation rates are among the highest in the world.
The official explanation is that this high rate of female labor force 
participation reflects the high degree of equal rights of women under 
socialism.
West German Industry 
The National Socialist central planning system was applied in the 
Western Occupation Zone in 1945 to prevent total economic collapse as 
was the case in the Soviet Occupation Zone.^G The system was maintained 
roughly until 1948 when major reconstruction of the Western Zone began. 
The Western Allies engaged in dismantling factories along with the Sov­
iets but never on the same scale. Dismantling of factories ended in 
1931. The major loss to West Germany was the Saarland, an important 
iron and coal producing region, to France. The Saarland was not re­
turned to West Germany until 1957.
Déconcentration of industry was not a major objective of the West­
ern Allies. The only real long term successes in this area were the 
breaking up of the I. G. Farben concern which totally dominated the
^‘♦SJBDDR 1968, p. 516.
**^Keefe, et al.. Area Handbook for East Germany, pp. 250-251. 
**®Stolper, et al.. The German Economy, p. 204.
47lbid., pp. 190-191.
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pre-war chemical industry, the breakup of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke 
steel complex, and the partial breakup of the coal and steel indus­
tries' relationship. Before the war the twelve largest steel and coal 
firms controlled 90 percent of the steel output and 50 percent of the 
coal output. These firms were broken up into 28 separate companies.**®
In 1948 the reconstruction of the German economy began in earnest. 
There are five identifiable factors which aided the rapid recovery of 
the West German economy. First was the enormous flood of refugees. In 
a severely damaged economy this flood of refugees would at first appear 
to be a handicap since they needed food and shelter. They increased the 
labor force, however, and were able and willing to work, and their ex­
istence helped hold down wages.**® Indeed they constituted a highly 
mobile manpower reserve, and the indrease in supply was largely respon­
sible for the fact that productivity increased more rapidly than wages. 
To get an idea of the impact of the refugees on the West German labor 
force, it has been estimated that prior to 1950 eight million refugees 
entered West Germany. Between 1950 and 1962 another 3.6 million left 
East Germany and settled in West. Germany.®® Second, there was a small 
defense burden. The defense burden including occupation costs fell 
from 5 percent of the GNP in 1950 to 2.7 percent in 1958. Third, the 
extent of damage to industry was not as great as is usually believed. 
Estimates of industrial capacity suggest that it was actually greater
**®Ibid., pp. 194-196.
**®Malcolm MacLennan, Murray Forsyth, and Geoffory Denton, Economic 
Planning and Policies in Britain, France, and Germany (New York; Fred­
erick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968), p. 51.
50Stolper, et al.. The German Economy, pp. 279-280.
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in 1946 than in 1936 as a result of the very high rates of investment 
during the war. The West German economy thus began the post-war per­
iod with a substantial industrial base. Fourth, much of investment 
in the post-war years was channeled into the vehicles, chemicals, elec­
trical engineering, and machinery industries which were all major growth 
sectors in the world economy. The output of these industries therefore 
helped earn a great deal of foreign exchange for needed imports. Fin­
ally, the volume of American aid both through the Marshall Plan and 
from other sources, $1.28 billion and $2.27 billion respectively, helped 
offset reparations and occupation costs.
After 1948 the West German government created what has been called 
the social market economy (Sociale Marktwirtschaft) which meant a free 
private enterprise system modified by aggregate target goals with tax 
and subsidy manipulation to achieve desired results.5% The policy, in­
stituted by Ludwig Erhard, Minister of Economics and later Chancellor, 
was designed to reduce the role of government interference in the econ­
omy. The approach was to have as much free play of market forces as 
possible.53 The German government's approach to the economy was based 
on the views of the so-called Freiburg School of economics founded in 
1932-1933. This school stressed what has come to be called the competi­
tive order or neo-liberalism. 5*+ It is necessary to emphasize that the
SlMacLennan, et al.. Economic Planning and Policies, pp. 52-53.
5^Hans-Joachim Arndt, West Germany: Politics of Non-Planning,
(Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1966), p. 17.
5^Andrew Schonfield, Modern Capitalism (New York; Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1965), pp. 239-240.
5‘*MacLennan, et al., Economic Planning and Policies, p. 35.
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views of the Freiburg School were not those of laissez faire. Govern­
ment intervention in the economy was not viewed as undesirable provided 
that it did not seriously disrupt the market process. The overall guid­
ing principle was that of the use of monetary policy to insure a stable 
monetary system and stable prices. Other legitimate types of government 
intervention included anti-monopoly laws, minimum wage legislation, and 
the correction of the undesirable effects of social costs.^5
The Freiburg School dealt with the areas of aggregate anti-cycli- 
cal policy and the political-ethical aspects of the competitive order.^6 
These are not of interest here because they affect industrial structure 
only indirectly. The thrust of the Freiburg School's recommendations 
for the competitive order was that government intervention in the econ­
omy should ideally make use of the market mechanism to achieve the de­
sired goal, or should be of such a nature that the intervention would 
make the economy more competitive.5? A special subsidy to industry in 
depressed regions, for example, would tend to direct firms into the de­
sired areas. Eventually, of course, the regions would no longer be de­
pressed if the policy worked. Such a policy would be more desirable 
than prohibiting industrial expansion in given areas to force firms to 
carry out expansion plans in the depressed areas.
The neo-liberal policies which directly affected the development 
of West German industry were free trade, anti-monopoly policy, the 
middle estate policy, denationalization of state-owned enterprises, and 
company law reform in the 1965 Company Law. Prior to the founding of 
the EEC in 1958, West Germany was one of the lowest tariff countries in
S^Ibid., pp. 39-41. ^^Ibid. , pp. 44-45. ^^Ibid., pp. 43-44.
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the OECC. In addition, by the end of the 1950's capital movements were 
almost entirely freed and exchange controls were eliminated. Such a 
policy was designed to increase competition in Germany and force German 
industry to be more efficient.^8
The development of an anti-monopoly law was not achieved until 1957 
with the passage of the Law against Restraints of Competition. The most
significant feature of the law is that it does not allow cartel agree­
ments to be enforced by the courts. This portion of the act was a sharp 
break with Germany's past. In any case exceptions were made. Cartels 
were not completely prohibited since many types of cartels were allowed. 
It was possible for example to form a cartel to arrange types of deliv­
ery and payment terms and for export and import agreements. In addition 
the Minister of Economics could license any cartel if he believed such 
a cartel were in the national interest.59
The law set up the Cartel Office (Kartelamt) with which all cartels 
were required to register. The Cartel Office was not given the power to
stop the formation of legal cartels except in the case where an agree­
ment unfairly restricted competition in the relevant market. A legal 
cartel can also be moved against if it abuses its power. Of course, the 
law did prohibit certain types of vertical and horizontal agreements.®*^ 
It appears, however, that the law has been used primarily against small­
er firms which have tried to form cartel-like agreements as a competi-
5®Ibid., pp. 54-55.
59gcoiper, et al.. The German Economy, p. 258.
®®MacLennan, et al., Economic Planning and Policies, p. 59.
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tive effort against their larger rivals.®^ The law does not prohibit 
mergers. It only requires that a merger in which the resulting firm 
would control 20 percent of the market be registered with the Cartel 
Office.®2
Probably more important to maintenance of competition and the soft­
ness of the anti-cartel law was Germany's entry into the EEC in 1957. 
Economic concentration in Germany could not be viewed seriously if 
there existed a number of competitors in the EEC. Clearly if other 
governments were encouraging larger scale firms, it would not be to 
Germany's advantage to unilaterally restrict the growth of the size of 
its firms.®® In any case the power of domestic cartels would only be 
effective if foreign competitors could be excluded from the market.
With a fall in barriers to trade within the EEC the effectiveness of 
German cartels would be severely diminished as would the market power 
of big domestic business firms.
Even though a very weak anti-monopoly law was passed, central and 
state (LHnder) governments have had a very active policy of encouraging 
small to medium-size firms. This policy is called the middle estate 
policy (Mittelstandpolitik). Such a policy is designed to help foster 
a competitive environment. Rather substantial amounts of funds have 
been made available to small and medium-sized firms; for example, about 
one billion marks in 1966 were made available to finance research and 
development, economic advisory services, vocational training, and loan
®1Arndt, West Germany, p. 37.
®^MacLennan, et al.. Economic Planning and Policies, p. 59. 
®®Ibid., p. 61.
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guarantees, and direct loans for the establishment of new firms. Finally,
financial aid has been provided to small and medium-sized firms which
face strong international competition. In this latter case the firms
in question are subsidized so that they may survive long enough to
move into other lines of production. Apart from direct financial aid
the various governments have had a policy of placing contracts with
small to medium-sized firms where possible. In the area of defense
spending, for example, the central government has normally placed about
45 percent of its contracts which do not require high technological
64
capability with small and medium-sized firms.
In the area of public ownership of industrial firms, the government 
has engaged in a policy of selling off its shares. One company which 
does not enter in the scope of this study, Volkswagen, was partially 
sold to the public in the early I960's. Other firms such as Preussag, 
the large mining and smelting company, and VEBA, a large mining and
power company, were partially denationalized in 1959 and 1965 respec-
65
tively.
The Company Law of 1965 was aimed at three important practices in 
West German industry. The first had to do with accounting practices and 
need not be discussed here. The second practice was that of controlling 
proxy voting of a company's shares by banks. Since the law was not in 
effect for most of the period under study, i.e., 1958-1967, it is of 
some importance to look at the question of how banks controlled voting 
shares in industry prior to 1965. Basically, the 1965 law provided that 
shareholders be advised of how a bank plans to vote their shares at com-
64 65
Ibid., pp. 62-64. Ibid., pp. 65-66.
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pany meetings. The shareholder can now give the bank permission to go 
ahead with its plans, or the shareholder is allowed the right to place 
his proxy with someone else or vote the shares himself. The final pro­
vision of significance is the prohibition of interlocking directorates 
between competitors.These last two provisions are of importance be­
cause of the nature of corporate law in West Germany. A group of share­
holders or an institution which owns or controls 25.1 percent of the 
shares in a corporation can be said to have effective veto power over 
any major corporate decision since most major decisions must be approved 
by 75 percent of the voting shares. This situation has allowed many in­
stitutions to control many more companies than would be possible if they 
had to have 50.1 percent of the voting shares. The major German banks 
own an estimated 10 percent of the shares of all public West German cor­
porations. They also are usually allowed to vote the shares of their 
clients who keep their shares in the banks. This right to vote shares 
on deposit (Depotstimmrecht) is of major significance because banks are 
the only stockbrokers in West Germany.G? To gain an insight into the 
power of the banks in 1960, 70 percent of the shares in companies whose 
nominal share of capital represented 75 percent of all quoted shares 
was controlled by banks either by outright ownership or by proxy. Prior 
to the 1965 Company Law these proxies given to the banks by shareholders 
were not for voting on specific issues but were a blanket authorization 
for the bank to vote the shares as it wished. In addition the banks
66Ibid., p. 65.
G?Frank Vogel, German Business After the Economic Miracle (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, 1973), pp. 56-57.
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could loan voting rights to one another or to some other third party 
(Stimmenleihe)
Quite clearly the majority of public corporations were controlled 
by a relatively few institutions. Schonfield points out that it would 
be incorrect to view this concentration of control as a modern version 
of the traditional industrial cartel. Even prior to the 1965 Company 
Law a bank officer or board member would not serve on the board of dir­
ectors of two competing firms. Of course different officers of a bank 
would sit on the boards of competing firms. In any case one major side 
benefit to German industry was that new techniques spread rapidly from 
one company to another. Again bank officers apparently did not divulge 
trade secrets between firms but did pass on new ideas about management 
and other business practices. There is some evidence, however, that 
bankers have directed their lending policies in such a way as to affect 
the development of the steel industry in a fashion that assured an or­
derly, coordinated transition in rationalization and expansion begin­
ning in 1962-1963. An uncoordinated market solution to overcapacity 
would result in the destruction of weaker firms. Instead the industry 
worked out joint long-term plans in which one firm would engage in one 
type of investment while another would invest in other types of facil­
ities.®®
What appears to be an overwhelming case for a highly concentrated 
industrial market structure has certain flaws. Schonfield himself 
points out that German businessmen are very respontlv-a to market forces
®®Schonfield, Modern Capitalism, pp. 251-252. 
G®Ibid., pp. 253-256.
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and competition does indeed e x i s t . O t h e r  observers also argue that 
at least "workable competition" exists?^ or that in the context of the 
EEC the degree of concentration in industry is not g r e a t . O n e  form 
of indirect evidence of the lack of coordination of enterprises is the 
method of forecasting market trends. There is strong evidence that no 
standard time frames are used by different firms for forecasting and, 
indeed, there seems to be no attempt to standardize forecasting methods 
so that firms can easily compare their estimates and procedures with 
those of other firms. There is, for example, much more standardization 
of firm planning techniques in U. S. i n d u s t r y . Indeed, even with the 
power of the banks in terms of voting power, there seems to be no real 
effort to coordinate West German i n d u s t r y . T h e  steel industry appears 
to be a rare case of direct intervention. Apparently the banks act as 
owners of corporations do elsewhere. As long as management does a good 
job of running the company, the banks seem to be content to leave the 
managers alone.
Although concentration ratios could not be found for each industry, 
the number of firms for each industry in 1967 is given in Table 2-4.
In only two cases were there less than 1000 firms in each industry in 
1967 considering all firms, and only three industries with less than
^^Schonfield, Modern Capitalism, p. 246.
Graham Hallett, The Social Economy of West Germany (New York; 
St. Martin's Press, 1973), p. 36.
^^Arndt, West Germany, pp. 24-25.
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Metal goods 4717 3399
Precision instruments 




Leather goods 2303 1394
Pulp and paper 7707 4282
Polygraphic 5879 3113
Glass and ceramics 1361 690
Food industries 9832 4905
SOURCE: Statistiches Bundesamt, "Industrie und Handwerk, Fachwerie
D," Zensus im Produzierenden Gewerbe 1967, (Stuttgart und Mainz: Verlag
W. Kohlhammer, 1971), pp. 4-5.
®A11 firms ^Firms with 10 or more employees
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1000 firms considering firms employing ten or more employees. Although 
such large numbers of firms are not conclusive evidence of competitive 
market structure, it is at least an indication of the plausibility of 
relatively competitive market structures. It is of course obvious that 
the use of the East German industrial classification method would tend 
to reduce the concentration and increase the number of firms in most 
industries because of the broader classification scheme. Finally, 
as was argued above, the gradual reduction of barriers to trade within 
the EEC is indicative of a relatively competitive environment. Clearly, 
it would be wrong to view each industry in West Germany in isolation 
from competition from similar industries in other Common Market 
countries.
CHAPTER III
THEORETICAL BASIS FOR COMPARING EAST AND WEST GERMAN INDUSTRY
Introduction
Comparison of East German and West German industries is made by 
use of the theory of production. Since time series are used, an attempt 
must be made to estimate technical change or changes in total factor 
productivity. The basic model for estimating technical change is based 
on Solow's pioneering work.l Following the model for technical change, 
the assumptions underlying the specification of output, capital, and 
labor are set out. These assumptions are then discussed in terms of 
the work of Jorgenson and Griliches^ and the work of Denison.^ Fin­
ally the specific forms of the production functions to be tested are 
specified.
The Model for Estimating Technical Change 
If ^  is a measure of real output and JK and ]L are measures of real 
capital and labor inputs, then the production function can be expressed
^Robert M. Solow, "Technical Change and the Aggregate Production 
Function," The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 39 (August 
1957), pp. 312-320.
2Dale W. Jorgenson and Zvi Griliches, "The Explanation of Produc­
tivity Change," The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 34 (July 1967), 
pp. 249-283.
^E. F. Denison, The Sources of Economic Growth in the United States 





(3-1) Q = f (K, L; t)
where _t is a time variable allowing for technical progress. If the case
of Hicks neutral technical progress is assumed, and the production func­
tion is homogeneous of degree one, then (3-1) can be rewritten as 
(3-2) Q = A(t) f (K, L)
where A(t) measures the effects of shifts in ̂  over time.**
Differentiating (3-2) totally with respect to time and dividing
by 2,
(3-3) Q/Q = A/A + Ek  K/K + El L/L
is obtained where dots denote time derivatives and 
(3-4a) Ejr = 9Q/9K (K/Q)
(3-4b) El = 3Q/3L (L/Q)
The terms Eĵ  and ̂  represent the competitive factor shares of capital
and labor respectively in the value of total output. If all income is
defined as labor or non-labor income and assuming labor and capital are
paid their marginal products, then
(3-5) Q = rK + wL
where jr is the real rate of return on capital and w is the real wage 
rate, and time subscripts are implied. The use of (3-5) implies the 
assumption of constant returns to scale. This assumption allows Eĵ  
and ^  to be estimated as
(3-6a) Sk  =
(3-6b) Sl = 1 - Sk
**Solow, "Technical Change," p. 312.
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where ^  and ^  are estimates of ^  and ^  respectively. Rearranging 
(3-3) and substituting ^  and ^  for ^  and ̂  gives 
(3-7) A/A = Q/Q - K/K - L/L
which when written in discrete form
(3-8) AA/A = Aq /q - Sg AK/K - Sl AL/L
allows the computation of technical change or shifts in the production 
function for each year. Up to now nothing has been said about the form 
of the production function, since the analysis holds true for any pro­
duction function in two variables which is homogeneous of degree one, is 
subject to neutral technical change, and exhibits constant returns to 
scale. To estimate the exact form of the production function, it is 
necessary to calculate the A(t) series. The computation is made as 
follows: Let
(3-9) A(t + 1) = A(t) {1 + AA(t)/A(t)}
where A(tj) = 1. The A(t) series represents the shift factor in the 
production function. Recalling that
(3-2) Q = A(t) f (K, L),
divide both sides by A(t) and (3-2) becomes
(3-10) Q/A(t) = f (K, L).
Output can now be computed net of technical change and the production 
function reduced to a single curve.^
Measures of Outputs and Inputs and 
the Effect of Technical Change
Output series for each industry in West Germany are net output and 
Sibid., p. 317.
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are estimates of net output in East German industry.® These series are 
in 1962 prices in West Germany and are in "unchanged plan prices" for 
East Germany. Presumably these "unchanged plan prices" are actually 
constant. They are based on 1955 prices.? Since no complete price in­
dexes by industry exist, the value of output is assumed to be expressed 
in real terms.
Labor input is measured in manhours unadjusted for quality change 
or labor intensity. In East Germany the assumption of full employment 
of labor seems reasonable, given a centrally planned, communist system. 
Adjustments for labor quality changes were not possible since the East 
German authorities do not provide a detailed breakdown of e.g., educa­
tional attainment by industry. As for changes in labor intensity the 
effect of a changed work week on output per manhour was unknown, and 
it seemed unwise to make ̂  priori estimates given that the East German 
manhours series themselves are estimates.® Since comparability was de­
sired, no quality or intensity adjustments were made on the West German 
manhours series. The use of manhours therefore assumes that labor ser­
vices can be measured by manhour inputs.® The use of manhours under-
®For the derivation of East German net output series, see Appen­
dix B.
?German Democratic Republic. Staatlichen Zentralverwaltung fllr 
Statistik, Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 
1965, (East Berlin: Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik,
1965), p. 99 (hereafter cited as SJBDDR followed by date).
®See Appendix D for the method of estimating manhours.
®John W. Knowles, The Potential Economic Growth in the United 
States, Study Paper No. 20, Joint Economic Committee (Washington, D. C.: 
Government Printing Office, January 30, 1960), p. 20. See also John W. 
Kendrick, Productivity Trends in the United States, (Princeton, N. J .: 
Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 32-33.
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states the contribution of labor input to the growth of output and is 
discussed below. In the case of West Germany one encounters the prob­
lem of the business cycle. There were two recessions between 1958 and 
1967. The first occurred in 1961-1962 and the second in 1966-1967. 
Clearly there was unemployed labor in these years. This fact is not so 
important for labor but becomes quite serious for capital estimates. 
Unfortunately the degree of unemployment in each of the seventeen West 
German industries could not be estimated due to a lack of unemployment 
statistics on a per industry basis.
Ideally what one would wish to have is a measure of capital serv­
ices. What is, in fact, available is a measure of the capital stock in 
both countries. The assumption is made that the flow of capital serv­
ices is proportional to the capital stock. This assumption leaves much 
to be desired but is useful at least as a first approximation.^® This 
assumption by analogy with using the labor force (i.e., employment) has 
the effect of possibly overstating the contribution of capital input to 
the growth of output. This point will be discussed below.
In East Germany there is no reason to expect less than full employ­
ment of capital, at least conceptually. While some capital hoarding by 
firms may be expected, the extent of this practice is unknown. In the 
case of West Germany capital utilization cannot possibly be at full em­
ployment levels in the four recession years. As Solow points out, it is 
not the capital stock that is important but the capital stock in use.^l 
The method of adjusting the West German capital stock involved the use
lOjorgenson and Griliches, "Productivity Change," p. 264. 
Solow, "Technical Change," p. 314.
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of available potential output figures. The ratio of actual to poten­
tial output was computed and multiplied by the actual capital stock..
Such a measure should give a measure of capital stock in use.1%
The question raised here is what does the preceding discussion 
mean in terms of technical change. Clearly "technical change" will in­
clude improvements in the quality of inputs and particularly labor in­
puts. To the extent also that labor input is measured in actual man- 
hours, technical change will tend to be overstated as will be discussed
below. It is to the problems raised by the use of the above definitions
of output, labor, and capital to measured technical change that the dis­
cussion now turns.
Jorgenson and Griliches (J-G) have argued that the growth of total 
factor productivity or technical change is negligible if output and fac­
tor inputs are correctly s p e c i f i e d . T h e i r  model shows that with the 
standard measure of technical change, i.e., (3-8), for the United States 
economy for the years 1945 to 1965 that technical change accounted for 
47.6 percent of the increase in total o u t p u t . B y  correcting for mea­
surement of capital, labor, and output, technical change is shown to ex­
plain only 3.3 percent of the increase in total output.
^^Barry N. Siegel, "Technical Change and Employment in the United 
States, 1890-1965," Western Economic Journal, Vol. 6 (March 1968), p. 
133. See Appendix C for a discussion of the capital stock of East and 
West Germany.
l^Micha Gisser and Paul Jonas, "Soviet Growth in the Absence of 
Centralized Planning," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 82 (March 
April 1974), pp. 340-341.
Jorgenson and Griliches, "Productivity Change," pp. 249-250.
ISibid., pp. 260-261. l^Ibid., P. 271.
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J-G begin by assuming the accounting identity
(3-11) Zqi yi = Epj Xj i = 1, n
j = 1, ..., m
where ^  is the quantity of the output; the price of the 
output ; 2j » the price of the input ; and Xj> the quantity of the
input. The current market value is therefore equal to the current 
market value of all inputs. In defining technical change J-G begin by 
differentiating (3-11) totally with respect to time and dividing the 
right hand side by total output and the left by total factor input re­
sulting in
(3-12) EWj 1i + Yi = ZVi X.j j
where
(3-13a) Wi =_ 9i ^iEqi Yi
(3-13b) V,J Epj Xj
The weight w^ is the share of the current value of output ^  in the total 
current value of output. Similarly Vj represents the share of the cur­
rent value of input in the total current value of all inputs. In ad­
dition the condition 
(3-14)
must be met.^^
J-G then construct Divisa output and input indexes which are the 
weighted average of the rates of growth of output and input or 
(3-15) y/y = Ew^ y^/y^
Ew^ = Evj = 1
l^Ibid., pp. 251-252.
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(3-16) x/x = Xj/Xj .
The definition of technical change is
(3-17) p = y/x
and the rate of growth of technical change is defined as
(3-18) p/p = y/y - x/x = Zw^ y±/y± ~ xy/xj
To this point the only real difference between the J-G model and 
the Solow model is the introduction of Divisa indexes and disaggrega­
tion of output. The disaggregation of output by economic sector is 
obviously desirable for aggregate studies. In terms of this disserta­
tion disaggregation has been made as fine as possible and thus (3-13a)
becomes
(3-19) w = q y /l^q^y^ = 1
since
(3-20) q y = Zq^y^ •
The use of the Vj share indices requires input prices. These are 
not available for capital for East Germany. In any case the use of 
Divisa share indices in the J-G model as well as Divisa output indices 
reduces the contribution of technical change to total output growth from 
0.476 to 0.457 or about two p e r c e n t . T h e  loss in explanatory power of 
using the measurement appears to be slight.
J-G argue that a major measurement error involves the assumption 
that output is homogeneous. In fact they argue that output must be 
broken down into at least two components— consumption goods (C) and 
investment goods (I). Let be the relative measurement error in the 
price of investment goods prices; JL*, the output of investment goods
l®Ibid., p. 252. ISlbid., p. 261.
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computed with the incorrect price of investment goods; and _I, the real 
amount of investment goods. Then the rate of growth of investment 
goods will be biased by the amount
(3-21) I*/I* - I/I = - Q*/Q* .20
It is clear that the rate of growth of Q*/Q is positive (negative) if
the measurement error of investment goods is negative (positive). Then
if K* is the amount of capital computed by use of the incorrect price 
of investment goods, the rate of growth of capital services will be 
(3-22) K*/K* - K/K = I/Q*K* - l/K .
This bias will be negative (positive) if the rate of growth of the mea­
surement error in investment goods is positive (negative).21
Finally, to compute measurement error in technical change, set up 
the relation
(3-23) P/P = wi I/I + wc C/C - vjr K/K - v^ L/L
where w^ and are the relative share of investment and consumption 
goods respectively. If P* is the index of technical change computed by 
use of incorrect investment goods prices, then
(3-24) P*/P* = w^ I*/I* + Wg C/C - Vg K/K - v^ L/L .
Subtracting (3-23) from (3-24) gives
(3-25) p*/p* - P/P = wi(I*/l* - I/I) - Vj^OC*/K* - K/K)
which is the bias in the rate of growth of technical change. This ex­
pression can be reduced to
(3-26) P*/P* - P/P = - w^ Q*/Q* - V (I/Q*K* - l/K)
by substituting (3-21) and (3-22) into (3-25).22
The above analysis by J-G allows for the elimination of signifi-
2°Ibid., p. 258. 21ibid. 22ibid.
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cant error in estimating technical change. In J-G this adjustment
reduces the contribution of technical change to the growth of output
23from 47.6 percent to 39.0 percent. The problem with using this method
is that no price indexes for East German investment goods are avail­
able. There is thus no way to correct for possible biases in invest­
ment goods’ prices. In addition, series on consumption and investment 
output for each industry are not available in either country.
J-G initially assumed that labor and capital services were propor-
2k
tional to the stocks of capital and labor. Such an assumption is 
not strictly correct. What is needed is a measure of utilization of 
capital and labor. Solow simply assumed that labor and capital were
unemployed by the same percentage as the unemployment rate with no
25
allowance for a shorter work week. J-G point out that this assumes
that the relative utilization of capital and labor is dependent on the
26
unemployment rate for labor alone. Their argument is that a better
measure of capital and labor utilization can be made separately. For
capital J-G estimate capacity use on the basis of power utilization
27
of electric motors. In this dissertation neither J-G's nor Solow’s 
method of adjusting the capital stock for utilization is possible.
Solow's method requires an unemployment rate for labor which is not 
available on an industry basis in either country, and J-G's method 
requires power utilization of electric motors which is also not
23 24Ibid., p. 264. Ibid., pp. 255-256.
25Solow, "Technical Change," p. 314.
26Jorgenson and Griliches, "Productivity Change," p. 265. 
^^Ibid., pp. 278-279.
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available on an industry basis. The assumption that capital services 
are proportional to the capital stock is therefore retained in this 
study. The final adjustment for capital stock is to disaggregate it
into five classes: land, residential and non-residential structures,
28equipment, and inventories. Capital stock figures for East German 
industry are as finely disaggregated as possible and thus this adjust­
ment cannot be made.
J-G make several adjustments for labor. They first makç Denison's 
adjustment for labor intensity. The reason is that the stock of labor
represents an upper boundary for labor services while actual manhours
29worked represent a lower boundary. Denison argued that while employ­
ment increased 44.1 percent in the Ü. S. economy from 1929 to 1957, 
manhours worked increased by only 17.5 percent. The average annual 
growth rates of real output, employment, and manhours were 2.93 percent, 
1.31 percent, and 0.58 percent respectively with labor comprising 
73 percent of total input. If labor input is measured by employment 
alone, with the assumption that a shorter work week has no influence 
on output per man, then the conclusion could be made that only the 
quantity of labor had changed. The contribution of labor to the growth 
of output would therefore have been 73 percent of the rate of growth 
of employment or a rate of growth of 0.96 percent per year (i.e.,
0.73 times 1.31). The increase in employment would thus explain 
33 percent of the rate of growth of output from 1929 to 1957 (i.e..
28Ibid., p. 267. See also E. F. Denison, Sources of Economic 
Growth, pp. 94-105.
29Jorgenson and Griliches, "Productivity Change," p. 266.
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0.96/2.93). On the other hand. If the assumption were made that labor
was measured by manhours with a shortened work week having no influence
on output per manhour, then 15 percent of the growth rate of output
(i.e., 0.73 times 0.58/2.93) could be attributed to the increase of 
30
labor.
Denison concludes that an adjustment must be made. He argues that
as hours worked decline, output per manhour declines by less than the
total decrease in hours worked. A one percent decline in manhours in
1929 is assumed to be fully offset by an increase in output per manhour.
By proportional interpolation he argues that intermediate points may
be found; for example at the mid-point between 1929 and 1957 a one
percent decline in manhours caused output per manhour to decrease by 
31
only 0.3 percent.
While Denison applies this adjustment to potential manhours per
man, J-G apply it to actual manhours per man. Their manhour series
thus reflects short-run changes in labor intensity due to business 
32fluctuations. While this adjustment would be desirable, the author
has no a priori knowledge of the rate of change in output per manhour
as manhours change. In addition, as Denison points out, his final
series is most useful in making long-run comparisons where effects
33
of the business cycle are to be eliminated. While this would be 
desirable in the present study, one of the major theoretical points
Denison, Sources of Economic Growth, pp. 37-38.
31 Ibid., p. 40.
32Jorgenson and Griliches, "Productivity Change," p. 266.
33
Denison, Sources of Economic Growth, p. 41.
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in evaluating the performance of a capitalist vis a vis a socialist
economy is that under socialism, business cycles do not occur. This
absence of business cycles is an alleged superior feature of a socialist 
34
economy. In this study, therefore, the effects of the business
cycles, actually minor recessions in 1961-1962 and 1967, will not be
abstracted out of the West German industrial data except for capital
stock adjustments.
The last adjustments J-G make in measuring labor services involve
quality adjustments and elimination of errors of aggregation. Quality
adjustments are made only on male members of the labor force by years
35
of schooling and by industry. Second, errors of aggregation are
eliminated, first by calculating the price of labor services by type
of labor service and then computing a Divisa index of the types of
labor services. For Divisa index of labor, weighted rates of growth
of the various types of labor services are added together, i.e., by
the relationship
(3-27) L/L = SVg Lg/Lg.
In this relationship v^ is the relative share of the type of labor
in the value of total labor. The next step is to create a weighted
index of manhour input (h) and employment input (ri) in the form
36
(3-28) L/L = ZVg ng/ng + EVg hg/hg.
Since labor input for German industry is as finely disaggregated as
34Oskar Lange, "On the Economic Theory of Socialism," On the Economic 
Theory of Socialism, ed. Benjamin E. Lippencott, (New York: NcGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1964), pp. 105-106.
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possible, such a weighted average would be meaningless because
and
(3-29) Vg = Zvg = 1
(3-30) L/L = Vg Lg/Lg
and therefore
(3-31) L/L = n/n + h/h.
As noted above, employment measures an upper boundary to the rate 
of growth of labor services and manhours measure a lower boundary to the 
rate of growth of labor services. The use of (3-31) would certainly 
overstate the rate of growth of labor services by the amount of h/h.
This study of German industry will use manhours unadjusted for changes 
in quality and intensity. The consequence of using this measure of 
labor input is to understate the contribution of labor to the growth 
of output and thus to overstate the growth of technical change or 
total factor productivity. Finally, the assumption is made that capital 
services are proportional to the capital stock.
Forms of the Production Function 
There are no a priori reasons to choose one specification of the 
production function over any others. Consequently, three forms are 
proposed. The first and most obvious form is the Cobb-Douglas produc­
tion function in the form
(3-32) Q = Ae'̂  ̂K® L^
where b = 1 - a. Equation (3-32) is assumed to exhibit constant returns 
to scale and can be rewritten as
(3-33) Q/L = Ae'̂ *̂  (K/L)*.
This form of the Cobb-Douglas production function is estimated in 
Chapter IV as well as the form
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(3-34) {Q/A(t)}/L = B (K/L)*
where B Is a pure scale parameter.
Another obvious choice is the CES production function in the form
(3-35) Q = A(t) {dK"P + (1 - d)L"^}
In this form v is the returns to scale parameter, ^  and (1 - ^) are the
distribution parameters, and £  is the substitution parameter because
of its relation to the elasticity of substitution, £  by the relation
38
(3-36) s = 1 .
1 + p
Kmenta has suggested a method of approximating (3-35) for direct 
estimation purposes. He does not assume any particular form of technical 
change. Kmenta approximates the CES production function by means of a
Taylor’s series expansion around p = 0 which yields
(3-37) log Q = log A + vd log K + v(l - d) log L
-h pvd (1 - d) (log K - log L)^
This approximation to the CES production function can be divided into
two parts. If 2. were zero, then the whole term -h pvd(l - d) (log K
2 39- log L) would disappear. Equation (3-37) is estimated along with
a variant of it which is deflated for technical change in the form
(3-38) log (Q/A(t)} = log B + d log K + (1 - d) log L
~h pd (1 - d) (log K - log L)^
37Kenneth J. Arrow, H. B. Chenery, B. S. Minhas, and R. M. Solow, 
"Capital-Labor Substitution and Economic Efficiency," Review of Economics 
and Statistics, Vol 43 (August 1961), p. 230. Referred to hereafter as 
Arrow et al., "Capital-Labor Substitution."
38
Ibid.
39J. Kmenta, "On Estimation of the CES Production Function, 
International Economic Review, Vol. 8 (June 1967), pp. 180-181.
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where B is a pure scale parameter. Because of the assumptions behind 
the computation of the A(t) series, i.e., constant returns to scale,
V = 1. Equation (3-37) and (3-38) will provide a test of not only the
CES production function but also the Cobb-Douglas case.
Other methods of estimating a CES production function rest on the
assumption of constant returns to scale. Ferguson defined the CES 
production function as
(3-39) Q = Ae*̂ *̂  {dK"P + (1 - d) L"P}
In this form Hicks neutral technical change is explicitly assumed. The 
following relationships were defined:
(3-40) log y = bg + b^t + b£ log w
where 2  is the output-labor ratio and w is the wage rate. Then the 
relationships
(3-41a) s = b 2 = 1
1 + p
(3-41b) c = bj^/d - bg)
hold. In this case p. and technical change can be directly computed
40
from the regression coefficients.
Since estimates of Hicks neutral technical change can be computed 
from (3-8), equation (3-40) can be rewritten as 
(3-42) log |̂ /A(t)^ = bg + b2 log w.
In (3-42) output is first computed net of technical change. The esti­
mate ^ 2  is still equal to the elasticity of substitution, £, and is 
now no different conceptually from the original formulation 
(3-43) log Q/L = log a + b log w
40
C. E. Ferguson, "Substitution, Technical Progress, and Returns 
to Scale," American Economic Review, Vol. 55 (May 1965), pp. 298-299.
55
41
for cross-section studies. As was pointed out in the model for 
estimating technical change, the operation described in equation (3-10) 
eliminates the effect of technical change on output and allows the 
estimation of production relationships on a single production surface.
The third choice of the production function is the constant
marginal shares (CMS) production function. The CMS production function
is useful in estimating production relationships where marginal factor
shares are constant but where the average share of capital or labor
can be rising, falling, or constant. In Bruno’s model the empirical
relation between output per unit of labor and the real wage rate is
linear and of the form
(3-44) Q/L = cw + d
where c>0 and represents labor’s marginal share of output. The symbol
^  may be positive, negative, or zero implying a rising, falling, or
constant average labor share respectively. The CMS model implies that
the marginal product of labor, 3Q/3L, is linearly related to the real
wage rate in the form
(3-45) 3Q/3L = pw + q
where £  and £  are institutional parameters. If £  = 1 and £  = 0, then
42
there is competitive equilibrium in both product and factor markets.
If £, £, £, and ^  are related to two other technical constants, 
a and m, in the following way
41
Arrow et al., "Capital-Labor Substitution," p. 228.
42Michael Bruno, Estimation of Factor Contribution to Growth 
Under Structural Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Vol. 9 
(February 1968), p. 50.
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(3-46a) c = p (1 - a)
(3-46b) d = q + ma
1 - a
where a f 1, then the following differential equation can be derived
from (3-44), (3-45), 3-46a), and (3-46b) :
(3-47) 8Q/3L = (1 - a) Q/L - ma.
Integrating (3-47) results in
(3-48) Q = c (K, t) - mL
where ^  is a constant of integration. If the production function is
assumed to be subject to constant returns to scale and Hicks neutral
technical progress, it can be written in the form
(3-49) Q = Ae^t - mL
or in the constant returns to scale form
(3-50) Q/L = Aê '̂  (K/L)^ - m
It is obvious that if m = 0, the CMS production function is the simple
Cobb-Douglas case and the elasticity of substitution, £, is one since
(3-51) s = 1 - ■ L/Q.i — a
If m > 0, then £  < 1 and if m < 0, then ŝ > 1. The interpretation of 
m > 0 is that the ratio of the marginal productivities of labor and cap­
ital increases over time. Such a conclusion suggests that strict Hicks 
neutrality does not hold, since technical change is capital saving. If 
m < 0, then the conclusion is that technical change is labor saving.**^ 
The case of £  = 1, £  = 0 represents perfect competition. If £  = 1 
and £  < 0, there would be a constant positive difference between the 
real wage rate and the marginal productivity of labor. As w and the
43lbid., pp. 52-53.
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marginal product of labor grow larger, the relative importance of the 
difference becomes smaller because (w + q)/w grows smaller as w becomes 
larger. If & = 0 and &  ^ 0, then there is imperfect competition in the 
labor market since
(3-52) p = 1 + 1/Eg
where Eg is the elasticity of supply of labor.
Conclusion
In conclusion then the basic theoretical approach is to estimate 
technical change from a linear homogeneous production function exhib­
iting constant returns to scale. At least three specifications of such 
a production function are used. These are the Cobb-Douglas, CES, and 
CMS functions. Attempts are made to estimate technical change both 
directly and indirectly from these specifications. In addition 
these forms of the production function imply differing elasticities 
of substitution. Of particular interest is whether or not the elas­
ticity of substitution diverges significantly from one. Finally, by 
use of the theory of production, it will be possible to show the contri­
butions of labor, capital, and technical change to the growth of net 
output by industry from 1958 to 1967.
44 Ibid., p. 54.
CHAPTER IV
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this chapter estimates of technical change, the contribution of 
capital and labor to the growth of output, and the elasticity of substi­
tution are presented. The first approach is to try to obtain these 
estimates directly using single equation estimation of three forms of 
the production function. Next, using the theory of production, esti­
mates of the contribution of labor and capital to the growth of output 
and technical change are made. Finally, estimates of the elasticity 
of substitution are made using output deflated for technical change.
Direct Estimation 
The three forms of the production function to be estimated are 
given by equations
(3-33) Q/L = AeCt (k /L)»
(3-35) Q = {dK"P + (1 - d) L"P}
and
(3-50) Q/L = Ae^^ (K/L)* - m
These equations are specifications of the Cobb-Douglas production func­
tion in constant returns to scale form, the CES production function, and 
the constant marginal shares (CMS) production function in constant 
returns to scale form.
For estimation purposes (3-33) is transformed to 
(4-1) log (Q/L) = log A + ct + a log (K/L) + e
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where £  is a disturbance term with zero mean and constant variance.
For the East German industries (4-1) gave uniformly unsatisfactory 
results. In all cases there were high standard errors or the wrong 
signs or both for the parameters. The explanation appears to be the 
high degree of correlation between time trend and the logarithm of 
the capital-labor ratio. Except for the chemicals, shipbuilding, 
and textiles industries in West Germany, the same problem prevented 
direct estimation of the parameters of (4-1). In all cases except 
the three West German industries cited, the correlation coefficient 
between time trend and the logarithm of the capital-labor ratio was 
0.9 or greater. Comparisons of the parameters using the specifica­
tion of the production function (4-1) proved impossible.
Direct estimation of (3-35) was attempted by the use of Kmenta's 
procedure summarized in (3-37). For least squares estimation the 
addition of the disturbance term je yielded
(4-2) log Q = log A + vd log K + v(l - d) log L
pvd (log K - log L)^ + e.
In all cases (4-2) yielded unsatisfactory results with high standard 
errors and/or wrong signs. The reason again was multicollinearity. 
This problem was however to be expected as Kmenta himself pointed out.
Kmenta suggested using an estimate of ^  to avoid the problem.^ A
reasonable alternative seemed to be the use of an outside estimate 
of 2" Accordingly an attempt was made to secure estimates of p.*
Ĵ. Kmenta, "On Estimation of the CES Production Function," 
International Economic Review, Vol. 8 (June 1967), p. 181.
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The method chosen was to assume constant returns to scale for the CES 
production function. Then following the example of Arrow, Chenery, 
Minhas, and Solow, £  could be estimated from
2(4-3) log (Q/L) = log bg + b^ log w + e.
The estimate of £  can be derived from (4-3) since 
(4-4) b^ = 1 ,
1 + p
(4-5) p = l/b^ - 1.
Equation (4-3) was estimated across industry boundaries for each
year. In no case for either East or West German industry was
3significantly different from one.
Another attempt to eliminate the effects of the multicollinearity 
involved estimation of the Cobb-Douglas specification in the form 
(4-6) log (Q/L) = log A + a log (K/L) + e
across industry boundaries for each year. Results of the estimation 
of £  were statistically reasonable for each year for West German 
industry. The estimates of £, however, showed little uniformity 
ranging from 0.336 to 0.502 in 1958 and 1967 respectively. The value 
of £  rose consistently over the ten-year period. For East German 
industry, estimation of (4-6) provided a statistically significant 
estimate of a in only two years— 1958 and 1959. For the years 1960 
through 1967 the Cobb-Douglas specification yielded values of £  not 
significantly different from zero. The year 1959 yielded a value
2
K. J. Arrow, H. B. Chenery, B. S. Minhas, and R. M. Solow, 
"Capital-Labor substitution and Economic Efficiency," Review of Econo­




for a significantly different from zero but the F ratio testing the sig­
nificance of the regression was below the critical F value. There ap­
pears to be no common factor for the value of a in East German industry
over the time period under investigation.^
The next specification of the CES production function involved an 
attempt to estimate technical change and the elasticity of substitution 
from (3-40), the Ferguson model, in the form
(4-7) log (Q/L) = bg + bĵ t + b2 log w + e.
For West German industry only building materials yielded the elastic­
ity of substitution, significantly different from zero. All other cases 
yielded high standard errors and/or wrong signs. The reason apparently 
was the high degree of correlation between time trend and the logarithm 
of the real wage rate which, except for building materials, was consis­
tently 0.90 or greater.
The results for East German industry were satisfactory statisti­
cally for nine of the seventeen industries including building materials. 
Except for building materials, however, no basis for a reasonable com­
parison of industries in the two countries existed. For building mater­
ials alone the elasticity of substitution in East Germany was 0.693 and 
in West Germany, 0.477.
The final functional form is the CMS production function given as 
(3-50) Q/L = Ae^t (k /l)^ - m.
Equation (3-50) can be rewritten as
(4-8) q /l + m = Ae^t (K/L)®.
In the form (4-8) it is nonlinear. Further the application of least
**See Appendix E.
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squares cannot be used to estimate the parameters A, m, ĉ, or Conger 
argued that (4-8) can be linearized by means of a logarithmic transfor­
mation of the form
(4-9) log (Q/L + m) = log A + ct + a log (K/L) + e.^
Obviously m is not known and must be estimated by a trial and error 
method. Using Conger's approach, an adaptation of Mayor's scanning tech­
nique,& values of m from zero to one were placed in (4-9). The coeffi­
cient of multiple determination, R^, was plotted against values of m as 
shown in Figure 3. If m > 0, then ^  would rise to a maximum. The val­
ue of m could then be narrowed down to two decimal places.? If 
reached a peak at m = 1, then larger integer values for m were inserted, 
and the scanning technique was performed until a peak range was found.
R
0 m
SOURCE: Darius J. Conger, "Structural Disequilibrium, Factor Pro­
ductivity and Soviet Economic Growth," (Ph. D. Dissertation, University 
of Oklahoma, 1974), p. 58.
FIGURE 3. Conger scanning technique for estimating m
^Darius J. Conger, "Structural Disequilibrium, Factor Productivity 
and Soviet Economic Growth," (Ph. D. dissertation. University of Okla­
homa, 1974), pp. 36-57.
^Thomas H. Mayor, "Equipment Expenditures by Input-Output Indus­
tries," Review of Economics and Statistics, LIII (February 1971), p. 27,
?Conger, "Structural Disequilibrium," p. 58.
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Values of m found in this way cannot be subjected to tests of sig­
nificance. A method for testing the hypothesis m > 0 was developed by 
Weitzman.® Let m = 0 and therefore the elasticity of substitution be 
one. Equation (4-9) then becomes the Cobb-Douglas case. To construct 
a test statistic, estimate the CMS function for m = 0 and m > 0. Let 
the computed error sum of squares for the CMS function with m = 0 be 
SERqj and the error sum of squares for the CMS function with m > 0 be 
SERcms* The test statistic g = (n-k) (SER^d - SERgg^g SER^mg) is an 
F statistic with (1, n-k) degrees of freedom.® The CMS function is 
therefore tested indirectly against the more restrictive Cobb-Douglas 
hypothesis rather than by computing the level of significance of m.
The Cobb-Douglas case is accepted if ^  is less than the upper confi­
dence level of Fj, n-k'^°
Attempts to estimate the CMS function in the form (4-9) for East 
German industry resulted in high standard errors and/or the wrong signs 
on The problem again was the high degree of correlation between 
time trend and the logarithm of the capital-labor ratio. In the case 
of West German industry the chemical, metal goods, textiles, clothing, 
and pulp and paper industries gave an m > 0 using the Conger scanning 
technique. The test statistic, however was less than the critical 
F value in all cases so that the CMS hypothesis was rejected in favor 
of the Cobb-Douglas hypothesis.
®Martin L. Weitzman, "Soviet Postwar Economic Growth and Capital- 
Labor Substitution," American Economic Review, LX (September 1970),
p. 682.
®Ibid., p. 683. 
l®Conger, "Structural Disequilibrium," pp. 59-60.
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All attempts to directly estimate technical change, the contribu­
tion of capital and labor to the rate of growth of output and the elas­
ticity of substitution directly failed for comparison purposes. The 
next step therefore was to approach the problem indirectly.
Estimation of Hicks Neutral Disembodied 
Technical Change.
Using
(3-8) AA/A = AQ/Q - AK/K - AL/L,
the contribution of capital and labor to growth of output and technical 
change can be computed. The results of using (3-8) for each industry 
are summarized in Tables 4-1 and 4-2. All rates of expansion were mul­
tiplied by 100 to present them in percentage form.
In East Germany in all industries the majority of factor expansion 
came from capital. In no case was the percentage rate of expansion of 
capital inputs (S^ AK/K x 100) less than 10.03. By way of contrast, 
the percentage rate of expansion of labor (S^ AL/L x 100) was greater 
than 10.03 in only four industries— metallurgy (21.26), electrotechni­
cal (10.43), machinery (13.32), and precision instruments and optical 
equipment (11.83). In nine industries the percentage rate of expan­
sion of labor was actually negative. The same pattern held true for 
West German industry, but to an even greater degree. The percentage 
rate of expansion of capital in all industries except shipbuilding and 
mining, two declining industries, far exceeded the percentage rate of 
expansion of labor where in fourteen of the seventeen industries, the 
percentage rate of expansion of labor was negative. In West Germany 
a large decline in manhours worked occurred between 1966 and 1967,
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TABLE 4-1
MEASUREMENT OF HICKS NEUTRAL DISEMBODIED 
TECHNICAL CHANGE IN EAST GERMANY
Industry Expansion Expansion of Factors* Technical
of Production^ Capital Labor Change
Mining 23.26 12.06 -10.49 21.69
Metallurgy 66.10 28.61 21.26 16.13
Chemicals 103.34 40.66 3.52 59.16
Building materials 87.36 29.75 -0.07 57.86
Electrotechnical 156.25 53.77 10.47 92.05
Shipbuilding 93.77 14.40 1.40 77.97
Machinery 122.61 26.32 13.32 82.97
Metal goods 133.29 31.30 3.50 98.49
Precision instruments 
and optical equipment 138.08 23.56 11.83 102.69
Woodworking 89.02 18.57 -3.30 73.75
Textiles 48.21 13.77 -12.89 47.33
Clothing 42.86 23.78 -1.36 20.44
Leather goods 64.31 10.03 -1.30 55.58
Pulp and paper 53.64 12.35 -7.09 48.38
Polygraphic 46.15 20.50 -4.41 30.06
Glass and ceramics 85.12 22.50 1.10 61.52
Food industries 47.26 18.51 -1.42 30.17
SOURCE: Appendix Tables B-6, C-4, and D-2, and equation (3-8).
All rates of expansion are in percentage form.
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TABLE 4-2
MEASUREMENT OF HICKS NEUTRAL DISEMBODIED 
TECHNICAL CHANGE IN WEST GERMANY
Industry Expansion Expansion of Factors^ Technical
of Production^ Capital Labor Change
Mining -10.05 -0.70 -23.76 14.41
Metallurgy 34.00 31.02 -5.83 8.81
Chemicals 159.80 60.33 5.11 94.36
Building materials 61.29 93.91 -3.27 -28.63
Electrotechnical 78.00 48.94 3.29 25.77
Shipbuilding -1.74 -9.93 -22.57 30.76
Machinery 31.61 41.18 -0.16 -9.41
Metal goods 46.75 57.03 -2.85 -7.43
Precision instruments 
and optical equipment 43.69 36.58 -4.53 11.64
Woodworking 50.94 45.40 -7.33 12.87
Textiles 30.88 28.36 -12.43 14.95
Clothing 42.21 45.57 -2.70 —0.66
Leather goods 3.16 19.34 -13.30 -2.88
Pulp and paper 56.19 53.34 -1.64 4.49
Polygraphic 57.53 50.16 0.60 6.77
Glass and ceramics 44.30 58.38 -8.30 -5.78
Food industries 51.68 60.71 -1.10 -7.75
SOURCE: Appendix Tables B-1, C-3, and D-1; and equation (3-8).
All rates of expansion are in percentage form.
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since 1967 represented a recession year.^l
In East Germany technical change is the largest component explain­
ing the rate of growth of output with the exception of metallurgy where 
both the percentage rate of growth of capital and labor exceeded the 
percentage rate of growth of technical change. In most of the West Ger­
man industries, however, the major contribution to the rate of growth 
of output came from the expansion of capital. The exceptions were min­
ing and shipbuilding, both of which are declining industries, and chem­
icals which showed the largest percentage rate of growth of output,
159.8 percent, of all West German industries. One major difference in 
the industrial performances of the two countries is that in all cases 
in East Germany the percentage rate of technical change was positive.
In seven West German industries— building materials, machinery, metal 
goods, clothing, leather goods, glass and ceramics, and food industries 
— it was negative. In these seven industries the percentage rate of 
growth of capital exceeded that of output while labor input declined. 
Negative technical change under these circumstances suggests diminish­
ing returns to capital, a decline in the quality of capital or a de­
cline in the quality of labor. Since a decline in the quality of cap­
ital is unlikely, the probable explanation is a combination of dimin­
ishing returns to capital and a lowering of the quality of the labor 
force. A lower quality of labor force for all West German industry is 
not improbable given the influx of Southern European and North African 
workers in the 1960's. In only two of the industries with negative
l^See Appendix D, Table D-1 for manhours in the seventeen West 
German industries. In all industries there were large declines in 
manhours worked.
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technical change, machinery and metal goods, would the use of unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers be unlikely. The very large percentage rate 
of growth of capital in such a short time span in all cases suggests that 
the effects of diminishing returns could not be ignored as a significant 
factor.
Estimation of Production Functions 
Net of Technical Change
While Tables 4-1 and 4-2 show the shift in the production function 
due to Hicks neutral technical change, they do not show technical change 
in a form suitable for use in estimating a production function. The 
production function is written in the form 
(3-2) Q = A(t) f (K,L)
showing that what is needed is an A(t) series. The A(t) series is com­
puted by means of
(3-9) A(t + 1) = A(t) U  + AA(t)/ A(t)}
where A(tj) = 1, and all forms of the production function to be estimat­
ed have output deflated for technical c h a n g e . T h e  production func­
tion is now written as
(3-10) Q/A(t) = f (K,L).
In Chapter III it was argued that deflating output for technical change 
would reduce the production function to a single curve which could be 
estimated by statistical methods.
The Cobb-Douglas production function is written as 
(3-34) = B(K/L)*.
For estimation purposes (3-34) is transformed to
l^See Appendix F, Tables F-1 and F-2 for the A(t) series.
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TABLE 4-3
COBB-DOUGLAS ESTIMATES FOR WEST GERMAN INDUSTRY 
FOR OUTPUT NET OF TECHNICAL CHANGE*










































Industry B ah SER F






Glass and ceramics 2.44 0.576
(0.004)
0.99947 0.0041 15086.34
Food industries 1.47 0.824
(0.005)
0.9972 0.0030 28563.43
SOURCE: Appendix Tables B-1, C-3, and D-1; and equation (4-10).
®The number of observations is ten. 
^Standard errors are given in parentheses.
(4-10) log {Q/A(t)} = log B + a log (K/L) + e.
L
This form of the Cobb-Douglas production function yields uniformly good 
results for both East and West German industry. The results of the 
Cobb-Douglas estimates are summarized in Tables 4-3 and 4-4. The only 
East German industries that might be questioned on theoretical grounds 
are mining which has a low capital share in output (0.102) and chemicals 
and food industries which have high capital shares in output (0.665 
and 0.715 respectively). These three industries show large departures 
from the "usual" Cobb-Douglas factor shares. The West German industries 
which show unusual capital shares are chemicals (0.614), and food 
industries (0.824).
One notable feature of the Cobb-Douglas estimates is the uniformly
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TABLE 4-4
COBB-DOUGLAS ESTIMATES FOR EAST GERMAN INDUSTRY
FOR OUTPUT NET OF TECHNICAL CHANGE*










































Industry B at r 2 SER F






Glass and ceramics 1.62 0.356
(0.014)
0.98715 0.0084 614.59
Food industries 1.15 0.715
(0.006)
0.99938 0.0020 12895.22
SOURCE: Appendix Tables B-6, C-4, and D-2; ;and equation (4-10).
The number of observations is ten.
Standard errors are given in parentheses.
higher estimates of the capital share of output for each West German 
industry compared to those for the East German industries. In only 
one case, shipbuilding, is the capital share higher in East Germany 
(0.439) than in West Germany (0.335).
Attempts to estimate the Ementa form of the CES production func­
tion (3-38) in the form
(4-11) log {Q/A(t)} = log B + d log K + (1 - d) log L
-h pd (log K - log L)^ + e
yielded parameters with high standard errors or the wrong sign or
both for East and West German industry. The problem is the high degree 
of correlation, 0.90 or greater, of the final term in (4-11) with 
log K.
Estimations of the elasticity of substitution by use of the CES
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TABLE 4-5
CES ESTIMATES FOR EAST GERMAN INDUSTRY
FOR OUTPUT NET OF TECHNICAL CHANGE®
Industry ^0
b














Building materials 0.412 0.823^
(0.130)
0.81244 34.65 -1.355




























bbg-s r 2 F T value for 
bg different 
from one
Leather goods 1.040 0.391
(0.086)
0.68587 17.47 -7.064
Pulp and paper 0.944 0.380
(0.075)
0.73459 22.14 -8.321
Polygraphic 0.214 I.2 2 3C
(0.282)
0.66433 15.83 0.790
Glass and ceramics 0.605 0.611
(0.136)
0.68051 17.04 -2.858
Food industries 1.546 0.648
(0.116)
0.77174 27.04 -3.059
SOURCE: Appendix Tables B-6, C-4, and D-2; and equation (4-12)
^The number of observations is ten.
^Standard errors are given in parentheses.
The elasticity of substitution is not significantly different 
from one
production function (3-42) in the least squares form 
(4-12) log {Q/A(t)} = bg + bg log w + e
yielded statistically acceptable results in all but six East German 
industries. The results for industries in both countries are summarized 
in Table 4-5 and 4-6. The six East German industries— chemicals, 
building materials, electrotechnical, metal goods, clothing, and poly­
graphic— had estimates of b2 , the elasticity of substitution, which 
were significantly different from one. In these cases the Cobb-Douglas 
model (4-10) is accepted, i.e., the elasticity of substitution is one.
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TABLE 4-6
CES ESTIMATES FOR WEST GERMAN INDUSTRY
FOR OUTPUT NET OF TECHNICAL CHANGE^
Industry to











































^ b b2=s F T value for 
b2 different 
from one
Leather goods 1.244 0.581
(0.021)
0.98874 702.48 -20.799






Glass and ceramics 1.105 0.769
(0.039)
0.97735 345.21 -5.961
Food industries 1.957 0.799
(0.026)
0.99031 817.63 -7.829
SOURCE: Appendix Tables B-1, C-3, and D-1; and equation (4-12).
®The number of observations is ten. 
^Standard errors are given in parentheses.
In all of the West German industries was significantly different 
from one. The elasticity of substitution for the seven West German 
industries— chemicals, electrotechnical, shipbuilding, machinery, 
metal goods, clothing, and polygraphic— was lower than the elasticity 
of substitution for the same East German industries. Of these seven 
industries, five were the East German industries which could best be 
described as Cobb-Douglas cases. In only one instance, the building 
materials industry in West Germany, was the elasticity of substitution 
greater than one.
The CMS production function given as (3-50) is estimated as
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(4-14) log |̂ /A(t) + = log B + a log (K/L) + e
Results for this form are provided in Tables 4-7, 4-8, and 4-9. Using 
the Conger scanning technique developed earlier in this chapter, nine 
East German industries— electrotechnical, machinery, precision instru­
ments and optical equipment, woodworking, leather goods, pulp and paper,
polygraphic, glass and ceramics, and the food industries— provided a
2rising ^  for ^  > 0. Of these industries only three— leather goods, 
pulp and paper, and the food industries— passed the test that m̂  > 0 
where the values of m^were 1.00, 0.50, and 1.00 respectively. Five of 
twelve West German industries— precision instruments and optical equip­
ment, leather goods, polygraphic, glass and ceramics, and the food indus­
tries— passed the test that m > 0 where the values of m were 0.49,
0.50, 1.04, 1.07, and 0.49 respectively.
The elasticity of substitution for the CMS production function was 
defined in Chapter III as
(3-51) s = 1 -|~ am J  L/Q
The elasticity of substitution for the East and West German industries 
with m > 0 is given in Table 4-10. Estimates of the elasticity of 
substitution in the range 0.839 to 0.959 are unlikely to be signifi­
cantly different from one.
Conclusion
Attempts to estimate technical change, the contributions of labor 
and capital to the growth of output, and the elasticity of substitution 
directly from the Cobb-Douglas, CES, and CMS production functions failed 
to provide estimates which could form a basis of comparison of East 
and West German industries. The procedure adopted, therefore was to
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TABLE 4-7 
CMS ESTIMATION FOR EAST GERMAN INDUSTRY



















0.24 0.99637 0.0024 2196.099
equipment 1.12 0.278
(0.007)








Leather goods 2.68 0.324
(0.001)
1.00 0.99994 0.0002 133325.33
Pulp and paper 1.98 0.279
(0.003)
0.50 0.99909 0.0013 8787.071
Polygraphic 2.44 0.310
(0.007)








1.00 0.99992 0.0007 99992.000
SOURCE: Appendix Tables B-6, C-4, and D-2; and equation (4-14).
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TABLE 4-8
CMS ESTIMATION FOR WEST GERMAN INDUSTRY
Industry B a m a' SER F
Metallurgy 2.14 0.540
(0.004)
0.50 0.99947 0.0022 . 15086.339
Chemicals 1.79 0.628
(0.141)





2.00 0.97520 0.0113 314.581
Shipbuilding 2.72 0.306
(0.009)
0.50 0.99280 0.0045 1103.111
Machinery 2.98 0.554
(0.020)







0.49 0.99966 0.0020 23521.411
Woodworking 2.34 0.574
(0.004)
0.48 0.99928 0.0032 17383.304
Clothing 3.44 0.543
(0.005)
0.48 0.99928 0.0032 11103.111
Leather goods 2.95 0.529
(0.004)
0.50 0.99941 0.0029 13560.515
Pulp and paper 0.00
Polygraphic 2.94 0.553
(0.001)










0.49 0.99994 0.0013 133325.33
SOURCE: Appendix Tables B-1, C-3, and D-1; and equation (4-14).
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TABLE 4-9
TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF CMS PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
AGAINST THE COBB-DOUGLAS PRODUCTION FUNCTION











and optical equipment 4.30 5.60
Woodworking 2.52 1.50
Clothing 3.75
Leather goods 64.00 5.79
Pulp and paper 5.53
Polygraphic 3.33 58.00
Glass and ceramics 2.18 21.81
Food industries 14.85 10.46




ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION FOR EAST 
AND WEST GERMAN INDUSTRIES 
FOR THE CMS PRODUCTION FUNCTION




Leather goods 0.918 0.919
Food industries 0.839 0.891
Pulp and paper 0.959
Precision instruments 
and optical equipment 0.938
Polygraphic 0.870
Glass and ceramics 0.864
SOURCE: Tables 4-7, 4-8, and 4-9. Appendix Tables B-1, B-6,
D-1 and D—2. -
estimate technical change by use of the standard Solow technique. In 
the process of estimating technical change, the relative contributions 
of capital and labor to the growth of output were obtained. The gene­
ral conclusion was that the rate of growth of capital was more important 
than the rate of growth of labor in explaining the rate of growth of 
output in both countries. Such a conclusion is consistant with the 
fact that both countries chronically were short of labor over the 
ten-year period. A rather surprising result was the observation that 
technical change explained more of the rate of growth of output in East 
German industry than in West German industry. The effects of the 1967
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recession undoubtedly tended to lower the estimate of technical change 
in West Germany. Another explanation is the nature of the index used 
to calculate the East German net output series. This particular point 
is examined in Chapter V.
After deflating output for the effects of technical change, the 
Cobb-Douglas, CES, and CMS production functions were again estimated 
to get an estimate of the elasticity of substitution. The CMS form 
did not prove to be useful for comparison purposes since only five 
of the seventeen West German industries and three of the seventeen 
East German industries could be successfully described by it. Of 
these industries, only two could be compared. In any case the elas­
ticity of substitution was high enough (above 0.8) that it would be 
unlikely to be different from one. The Cobb-Douglas and CES produc­
tion functions in the forms (4-10) and (4-12) provided the best 
results. These results together with the other estimates are analysed 
in Chapter V.
CHAPTER V 
COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Comparison of East and West German Industries
In Chapter IV the measures of Hicks neutral technical change 
were shown to be of greater significance in explaining the rate of 
growth of output in all East German industries other than for chemicals 
than in comparable West German industries. Technical change is 
simply defined as the "residual" after account is taken of the effects 
of the rates of growth of capital and labor. The nature of the residual 
is unknown, but as was shown in Chapter III, it may be due to measure­
ment errors in the definition of capital, labor, or output. In 
Chapter IV three possible explanations for the lower rate of technical 
change in West German industry were the effects of the business cycle, 
a declining but unmeasured quality of the labor force, and diminishing 
returns, particularly where measured technical change was negative.
The case for diminishing returns seems strong given the rapid rate 
of growth of capital compared to that of labor. This explanation 
should apply to East German industry as well, except that the rate of 
growth of capital vis a vis labor in East Germany was not as pronounced. 
There were in addition no business cycles in East Germany for the 
period under consideration. One method of indirectly checking for the 
existance of diminishing returns would be to observe the behavior of 
the capital-output ratio. A rising capital-output ratio would indicate
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a decline in the effectiveness of capital over time. Table 5-1 shows 
a rising capital-output ratio in all of the West German industries 
except shipbuilding and chemicals. By comparison unambiguously rising 
capital-output ratios are found only for the mining and clothing 
industries in East Germany. For the East German industry metallurgy 
the capital-output ratio fell between 1958 and 1963 and then rose 
again in 1967. In the building materials, pulp and paper, and poly­
graphic industries the capital-output ratio rose between 1958 and 1963 
and then fell again in 1967. In all five of these East German indus­
tries, however, the capital-output ratio in 1967 was lower than in 1958. 
While comparisons of capital-output ratios indicate higher productivity 
of capital in West Germany than in East Germany, i.e., the West German 
capital-output ratios in all West German industries except shipbuilding 
and clothing are lower, the trend over the ten-year period is clear.
Of the seventeen East German industries, ten were utilizing their capital 
stock more efficiently, and only two were experiencing an unambiguously 
declining effectiveness of their capital stock. Of the seventeen West 
German industries only one, chemicals, was experiencing increased 
productivity of the capital stock.
There was one point brought up in Chapter IV dealing with the 
rate of growth of output that requires further explanation. The net 
output series for West German industry can be accepted without question 
despite some reservations raised by Jorgenson and Griliches in Chapter 
III about further disaggregation being desirable. The net output 
series for East German industry is based on the index of gross output.
The point is made in Appendix B that gross output can increase without 
any corresponding increase in real output. If there are more stages of
85
TABLE 5-1
CAPITAL-OUTPUT RATIOS FOR EAST AND 





1958 1963 1967 1958 1963 1967
Mining 2.17 2.30 2.38 5.55 7.70 9.60
Metallurgy 1.54 1.67 1.77 3.35 2.97 3.26
Chemicals 1.88 1.52 1.32 3.15 2.62 2.48
Building materials 1.00 1.24 1.46 3.86 4.28 3.81
Electrotechnical 0.83 0.86 0.89 1.06 0.87 0.85
Shipbuilding 2.37 1.69 1.77 2.06 1.71 1.42
Machinery 0.79 0.93 1.05 2.00 1.51 1.48
Metal goods 0.65 0.72 0.87 1.72 1.38 1.24
Precision instruments 
and optical equipment 0.78 0.85 0.92 1.45 1.14 1.01
Woodworking 0.84 0.91 0.97 1.79 1.50 1.46
Textiles 1.32 1.42 1.51 2.28 2.20 2.06
Clothing 0.50 0.56 0.62 0.42 0.45 0.46
Leather goods 0.68 0.80 0.91 1.89 1.61 1.42
Pulp and paper 1.30 1.43 1.53 4.50 4.72 4.36
Polygraphic 0.93 1.01 1.08 1.68 1.77 1.71
Glass and ceramics 0.78 0.99 1.11 2.72 2.53 2.62
Food industries 1.11 1.20 1.28 1.99 1.86 1.71
SOURCE: For East German industries. Table 2-1; for West German
industries. Appendix Tables B-1 and C-3.
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production added to the production of a particular good, then the 
number of double countings will increase and gross output will rise.
The trend noted in Chapter II for the growth of combines and vertical 
integration would tend to overstate the rate of growth of gross output 
to an unknown degree. The result would be a higher rate of growth of 
output and thus a higher measure of the rate of technical change. This 
same higher rate of growth of output could also explain in part the 
declining capital-output ratios experienced in ten of the East German 
industries. The extent of this effect on output, however, cannot be 
measured. Subject to this qualification, the conclusion stands that 
the trend of capital productivity in most of the East German industries 
has been better than in comparable West German industries.
In comparison of the sources of growth other than technical change, 
capital was overwhelmingly the most important factor in industries in 
both countries. The reasons why such a result could be expected was 
suggested in Chapter II» where the facts of full employment in West 
Germany between 1958 and 1966 and a slow population growth rate would 
both tend to reinforce the tendency to substitute capital for labor.
The tendency would also be strong in East Germany where the labor 
force did not show any significant change over the ten-year period.
In Chapter IV two production functions, the Cobb-Douglas and the 
CES in forms (4-10) and (4-12) respectively, provided statistically 
satisfying results. There are no statistical reasons for choosing one 
production function over the other except in the six East German 
industries where the elasticity of substitution was not significantly 
different from one. One method of making a choice would be to directly 
calculate the share of labor in real output using
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(5-1) = wL/Q.
As is well-known, the Cobb-Douglas formulation gives constant factor
shares of capital and labor in total industry output over time. If
the share of labor in total industry output is not constant, then the
CES formulation would be appropriate under the conditions that labor's
share rises when the wage rate increases at a faster rate than neutral
technical change and falls when the wage rate increases at a slower
rate than neutral technical change when the elasticity of substitution
is less than one. The relationship would be reversed if the elasticity
1
of substitution were greater than one. In Table (5-2) and (5-3) the 
percentage rate of change of the wage rate and technical change are 
given along with the share of labor in output for 1958, 1963, and 1967 
for the industries for which the CES production function cannot be 
ruled out on a statistical basis. Where a Cobb-Douglas case appears 
appropriate, the corresponding estimated share of labor derived from 
the estimation of the Cobb-Douglas production function (4-10) is 
given.
In East German industry the share of labor is relatively constant 
in metallurgy and the food industries only. All of the other industries 
show declining labor shares. The elasticity of substitution is less 
than one, and except for the pulp and paper and the mining industries, 
the percentage rate of growth of real wages is less than the percentage 
rate of growth of neutral technical change. In the mining and the pulp 
and paper industries the share of labor declined despite the fact that
1
K. J. Arrow, H. B. Chenery, B. S. Minhas, and R. M. Solow, 
"Capital-Labor Substitution and Economic Efficiency," Review of Economics 
and Statistics, Vol. 43 (August 1961), p. 244.
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TABLE 5-2
THE PERCENTAGE RATES OF GROWTH OF THE WAGE RATE AND
NEUTRAL TECHNICAL CHANGE AND THE SHARE OF LABOR
IN TOTAL OUTPUT FOR EAST GERMAN INDUSTRY
Industry Percentage Rate of Growth Labor's Share
Wage Rate^ Technical
Change
1958 1963 1967 C-D
Mining 30.34 21.69 0.91 0.86 0.85
Metallurgy 13.61 16.13 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.54
Shipbuilding 24.03 77.97 0.73 0.56 0.48




equipment 39.23 102.69 0.76 0.61 0.53
Woodworking 36.23 73.75 0.77 0.64 0.53
Textiles 43.25 47.33 0.65 0.60 0.50
Leather goods 30.91 55.58 0.64 0.55 0.50
Pulp and paper 49.81 48.38 0.69 0.68 0.60
Glass and 
ceramics 39.32 61.52 0.79 0.70 0.61
Food
industries 47.71 30.17 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28
SOURCE: Appendix Tables B-6, D-2, G-2, and Table 4-4.
^The percentage rate of growth in wages is calculated by Aw/w x 100. 
^Actual Cobb-Douglas estimates of labor's share of output.
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TABLE 5-3
THE PERCENTAGE RATES OF GROWTH OF THE WAGE RATE AND 
NEUTRAL TECHNICAL CHANGE AND THE SHARE OF LABOR 
IN TOTAL OUTPUT FOR WEST GERMAN INDUSTRY
Industry Percentage Rate of Growth Labor's Share
Wage Rate® Technical
Change
1958 1963 1967 C-D^
Mining 58.70 14.41 0.49 0.43 0.41
Metallurgy 77.86 8.81 0.40 0.45 0.43 0.43
Chemicals 85.36 94.36 0.29 0.28 0.25 0.32
Building
materials 74.35 -28.63 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.30
Electro­
technical 88.41 25.77 0.42 0.47 0.48
Shipbuilding 88.54 30.76 0.53 0.68 0.67
Machinery 83.80 -9.41 0.39 0.47 0.53




equipment 85.32 11.64 0.45 0.51 0.52
Woodworking 88.84 12.87 0.39 0.41 0.39 0.39
Textiles 60.77 14.95 0.48 0.43 0.43 0.43
Clothing 85.64 —0.66 0.37 0.43 0.44
Leather goods 85.97 -2.88 0.41 0.46 0.52
Pulp and 
paper 133.33 4.49 0.33 0.38 0.37
Polygraphic 98.42 6.77 0.36 0.40 0.43
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TABLE 5-3— Continued
Industry Percentage Rate of Growth Labor’s Share
Wage Rate& Technical
Change
1958 1963 1967 C-D^
Glass and 
ceramics 89.88 -5.78 0.43 0.45 0.45 0.42
Food
industries 87.14 -7.75 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.18
SOURCE: Appendix Tables B-1, D-1, G-1, and Table 4-5.
^The percentage rate of growth in wages is calculated by 
Aw/w X 100.
^Actual Cobb-Douglas estimates of labor’s share of output.
the rates of growth in wages exceeded that of technical change, and 
the elasticities of substitution were 0.365 and 0.380 respectively.
In West German industry the share of labor is relatively constant 
in metallurgy, chemicals, building materials, woodworking, textiles, 
glass and ceramics, and the food industries. In all the other indus­
tries except mining the share of labor is rising where the elasticity 
of substitution is less than one and the percentage rate of growth 
in the wage rate exceeds the percentage rate of growth in technical 
change. As in East Germany the share of labor is declining despite 
the fact that the percentage rate of growth of the wage rate exceeds 
that of technical change, and the elasticity of substitution is 0.829. 
In mining in both countries and in pulp and paper in East Germany 
the possibility exists that Hicks neutral technical change does not 
adequately describe the type of technical change or that constant 
returns to scale represents a misspecification of the production
91
function. Since the CES function represents the more general case, 
it will be accepted with reservations as being the more nearly correct 
specification for mining in both countries and for pulp and paper in 
East Germany.
Table 5-4 shows the elasticity of substitution for each East and 
West German industry. In four cases in both countries— metallurgy, 
chemicals, building materials, and the food industries— the elasticity 
of substitution is one, implying a Cobb-Douglas production function.
In only one CES case, machinery, are the elasticities of substitution 
in East and West Germany roughly equal, i.e., 0.54 and 0.52 respec­
tively. In mining, precision instruments and optical equipment, 
woodworking, textiles, leather goods, pulp and paper, and glass and 
ceramics the elasticity of substitution is greater in West Germany.
Conclusions
The basic hypothesis of this study was that there should have 
been little or no difference in the use of resources in East and West 
German industry since the two countries were artificially created 
out of a formerly unified developed country. On one point there
was little difference— the growth of capital was the major factor
source of growth of output compared to labor. The rate of change of 
labor in fact was negative in most industries in both countries. Here 
similarity of performance essentially ceased. In East German industry 
the rate of growth of output exceeded that of West Germany in all but 
the chemicals industry. In addition the rate of technical change was 
a more important source of growth of output than capital or labor in
all East German industries except for metallurgy and was more impor­
tant than the rate of technical change for any West German industry
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2except chemicals. One reason suggested for the higher rate of technical 
change in East Germany was the use of gross value output indices in 
computing net output series since the growth of gross output places an 
upward bias on the rate of growth of output. Another explanation for 
the relatively better performance of East German industry was dimin­
ishing returns to capital suggested by rising capital-output ratios 
in all but two West German industries and falling capital-output ratios 
in ten East German industries. One point of importance was the busi­
ness cycle. East Germany did not have business cycles, where West 
Germany did. The proposition that an economy without business cycles 
will perform better over time as suggested in Chapter III appears valid, 
at least for the two Germanies. In any case there is little doubt 
as to which economy uses its capital more effectively. Fifteen of the 
West German industries had lower capital-output ratios compared to the 
same East German industries. The exceptions were shipbuilding and 
clothing. One probable explanation for higher capital-output ratios 
in East German industry is that some unknown degree of capital hoarding 
still takes place in East German industry despite the reforms insti­
tuted in 1958 and 1963 to eliminate this practice. Another possible
explanation is the lower degree of automation in East German industry
3
compared to West German industry. These factors would be system 
specific. Capital hoarding is a well-known feature of centrally
2See Tables 4-1 and 4-2.
3Herbert Wilkins, "Labor-Productivity in East and West German 
Industry— A Comparison," Economic Bulletin, Vol. 7 (June 1970), 
p. 56.
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planned socialist economies. The lower degree of automation can also
be attributed to the political system which has prevented extensive
economic contacts between its managers and those in foreign countries.
The economic system with its emphasis on plan fulfullment would tend
to discourage innovation which is risky and therefore might prevent 
5plan fulfillment. As Wilkins points out, the East German authorities
6have been pushing automation as a method of increasing productivity.
The falling capital-output ratios would be indicative of some degree 
of success in this area.
A final area of difference is in the elasticity of substitution.
In only five industries in both countries— metallurgy, chemicals, 
building materials, the food industries, and machinery— were the 
elasticities of substitution the same. In the first four industries 
the elasticities of substitution were one. In machinery the elasticity 
of substitution was less than one. While real wages rose in all indus­
tries in both countries over the ten-year period, the share of labor 
in output declined in the East German industries which were described 
by the CES production function. The share of labor rose in the CES 
industries in West Germany. The implication is that East German workers
4For a discussion of the tendency of managers to hoard capital 
see Herbert S. Levine, "Pressure and Planning in the Soviet Economy," 
in The Soviet Economy, 3rd edition, ed. Morris Bornstein and Daniel 
Fusfeld (Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1970), pp. 64-82,
especially pp. 68-70. In the same source a detailed explanation of 
managerial motivation is given by Joseph S. Berliner, "Managerial 
Decisionmaking: A Comparison of the United States and the Soviet Union," 
pp. 165-195. In particular see pp. 172-185
5
See Joseph S. Berliner, "Managerial Decisionmaking," pp. 181-182 
for a discussion of the Soviet experience in this area.
6
Herbert Wilkins, "Labor-Productivity," p. 56.
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did not benefit ifiilly from the rise in technical change or, as it is so 
often called, to<tal factor productivity. Accordingly an ever greater 
share of output ■went to the enterprises and the state. Theoretically 
this state of afŒairs should have been expected to have generated 
higher rates of finvestment and a more rapidly growing capital stock 
and thus a greater contribution of capital to the growth of output 
than in West Germany where the relationships are reversed. This was 
not, however, the case. The probable explanation lies in the fact 
that the East Gecinan authorities can allocate investment funds generated 
by enterprises to other areas of the economy. In West German industry 
the share of output going to a firm in an industry would be more likely 
to be reinvested in that firm. The above comparison suggests system 
specific sources of differences in both labor shares and in the growth 
of capital.
The above conclusions should be accepted only with reservations.
The upward bias in the East German industrial output series has been 
noted. The manhour series for each East German industry may contain a 
downward bias in manhours worked, since the assumption was made that 
every employee worked the same number of hours as a socialist production 
worker. If manhours are understated, labor's contribution to the growth 
of output is understated, and technical change is overstated. In addi­
tion labor's share of output would be understated, if manhours were 
understated.
Other factors should be considered as limitations on the final 
conclusions. The econometric estimates of the elasticity of substitu­
tion are at best approximations because of the small number of observa­
tions on capital, labor, and output. To have more confidence in the
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econometric results a much larger number of observations is needed.
At least as serious a limitation on the production function estimates
and the estimates of technical change is the assumption that labor and
capital are paid their marginal products. Such an assumption is rather
weak especially for a communist economy such as East Germany. The
assumption does not seem as arbitrary, however, as simply assigning
a factor weight to capital for the whole period under review as has
been done by researchers such as Bergson for studies of the Soviet 
7
economy.
Other weaknesses of the study stem from the use of manhours unad­
justed for changes in the quality of the labor force and the use of the 
gross capital stock as a measure of capital services. The use of 
manhours understates labor's contribution to the rate of growth of 
output. The bias introduced by using manhours would cause labor's 
share of total output to be understated. This bias could be more 
serious for East German industry where a probability exists that man- 
hours are already understated. The same conclusion holds for the 
failure to make adjustments in the quality of labor. The use of the 
gross capital stock as a measure of capital services would tend as 
noted in Chapter III to overstate the contribution of capital to the 
growth of output.
The conclusions in support of a better dynamic performance for 
East German industry need to be considered as very tentative in view 
of the restrictive assumptions and data limitations. To reach any firm
Abram Bergson, "National Income," in Economic Trends in the Soviet 
Union, edited by Abram Bergson and Simon Kuznets (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 19-20.
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conclusions more data of greater reliability is needed. Subject to 
these obvious limitations the hypothesis of no essential differences 
in the resource use in East and West Germany must be in general 
rejected. The major common feature found was the importance of capital 
compared to labor as a leading factor contributing to the growth of 
output. Such a conclusion could reasonably be expected for any advanced 
industrialized country. Apparently the type of system does matter for 
resource utilization.
APPENDIX A
METHOD OF COMPARING EAST AND WEST GERMAN INDUSTRIES
Since the definition of industrial boundaries in East and West 
Germany differs, it was first necessary to arrange the West German 
industrial classifications to conform to the East German classifi­
cation scheme. The problem revolved around the fact that there are 
nineteen industries other than construction and agriculture in East 
Germany and 44 different industries in West Germany. The method used 
for comparison was developed by the Deutsches Institut fUr Wirtschafts-
forschung (DIW) in Berlin in Bericht der Bundesrierung und Materialien
1
zur Lage der Nation 1971 prepared for the West German government.
1 Federal Republic of Germany, Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche 
Beziehungen. Bericht der Bundesregierung und Matierialien zur Lage 




COMPARATIVE INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION METHOD
East German Industrial 
Classification




































a . Iron working
b. Iron and steel casting











a. Steel girder and railway 
car construction
b . Machinery 
Metal goods
a. Iron goods, sheet metal 
and hardware






c. Musical instruments, 







c. Shoe production 
Pulp and paper
a. Paper and glue




East German Industrial 
Classification
West German Industrial 
Classification
16. Glass and ceramics 16. Glass and ceramics
a. Glass industry
b. Ceramics and pottery
17. Food industries 17. Food industries
SOURCE; Federal Republic of Germany, Bundesministierium fUr 
innerdeutsche Beziehungen, Bericht der Bundesregierung und Matierialien 
zur Lage der Nation 1971 (Kassel: A. G. Wenderoth, 1971), p. 107.
APPENDIX B 
OUTPUT SERIES FOR EAST AND WEST GERMANY 
TABLE B-1
NET OUTPUT IN WEST GERMAN INDUSTRY; 1958-1967 IN 1962 PRICES
(MILLIONS OF DM)
Industry 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Mining 10687 10328 10569 10720 10779 10965 11180 10854 10331 9613
Metallurgy 11232 12221 14246 14250 13776 13206 15527 15688 14893 15051
Chemicals 13969 16362 18892 20505 22708 24975 28484 31419 34225 36391
Building materials 4826 5497 5901 6401 6846 7051 7969 8071 8222 7784
Electrotechnical 9658 10571 12554 13924 14226 14557 16006 17847 17590 17191
Shipbuilding 1265 1171 1170 1147 1090 1008 1097 1178 1232 1243
Machinery 17226 17753 20287 22257 22499 22008 23460 25035 24650 22723
Metal goods 
Precision instruments
6836 7503 8690 9004 9057 9330 10418 11088 10801 10032
and optical equipment 1657 1781 1995 2041 2021 2043 2350 2496 2492 2381
Woodworking 4623 4926 5438 5672 5967 5870 6533 6994 7197 6978
Textiles 6547 7108 7915 8158 8393 8511 8829 9216 9216 8569
Clothing 3523 3790 4105 4447 4691 4738 5019 5484 5596 5010
Leather goods 2025 2140 2213 2263 2294 2317 2387 2451 2355 2089
Pulp and paper 2974 3210 3543 3605 3809 3947 4264 4522 4659 4645
Polygraphic 3033 3200 3521 3779 3965 4096 4350 4623 4790 4778
Glass and ceramics 2165 2304 2567 2667 2781 2827 3094 3304 3324 3124
Food industries 15925 16689 17690 18697 19832 20724 22033 23065 23719 24155
oo
SOURCE: Rolf Krengel, Egon Baumgart, Arthur Boness, Rainer Pischner, and KËthe Droege, Produktlons-
VOlumen und -potential, Produktionsfaktoren der Industrie im Gebiet der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
(Berlin: D.I.W., 1968, p. 5. Referred to hereafter as Krengel, et al., Produktionsvolumen 1968.
TABLE B-2
POTENTIAL NET OUTPUT IN WEST GERMAN INDUSTRY: 1958-1967 IN 1962 PRICES
(MILLIONS OF DM)
Industry 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Mining 10824 11224 11516 11757 11896 11878 11845 11821 11591 11218
Metallurgy 13541 14175 14814 15712 16808 17810 18661 19730 19906 20243
Chemicals 15153 17250 19258 21575 24017 26646 29533 32826 36785 41102
Building materials 5462 5724 6188 6803 7410 7860 8265 8753 9117 9210
Electrotechnical 11142 12145 13309 14752 16345 17814 19096 20368 21660 22808
Shipbuilding 1265 1342 1385 1406 1424 1436 1458 1494 1521 1540
Machinery 19645 20329 21279 22662 24065 25083 25851 26775 27583 28008
Metal goods 
Precision instruments
7931 8391 9040 9819 10532 11159 11750 12350 12884 13232
and optical equipment 1754 1864 1995 2133 2273 2418 2543 2666 2792 2910
Woodworking 4944 5220 5561 5941 6345 6747 7109 7498 7896 8225
Textiles 7306 7648 8085 8593 8999 9292 9562 9890 10213 10428
Clothing 3761 4032 4325 4625 4928 5163 5387 5640 5883 6003
Leather goods 2266 2314 2370 2441 2490 2514 2539 2570 2582 2555
Pulp and paper 3029 3274 3543 3838 4166 4464 4680 4889 5122 5355
Polygraphic 3117 3404 3757 4074 4344 4627 4887 5130 5362 5592
Glass and ceramics 2300 2443 2608 2817 3018 3179 3338 3535 3720 3813
Food industries 16330 17261 18352 19452 20453 21475 22545 23583 24569 25536
SOURCE: Rolf Krengel, et al., Produktionsvolumen 1968, p. 9.
TABLE B-3
INDEX OF GROSS OUTPUT IN EAST GERMAN INDUSTRY: 1958-1967
(1955 = 100)
Industry 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Mining 114 118 115 119 126 130 135 136 135 141
Metallurgy 125 139 154 162 168 170 180 189 199 208
Chemicals 128 142 153 165 177 189 205 223 243 260
Building materials 142 163 178 187 200 201 231 243 255 266
Electrotechnical 152 183 211 227 259 275 301 327 362 389
Shipbuilding 109 137 153 138 143 157 176 197 196 211
Machinery 131 158 177 195 214 225 243 258 273 292
Metal goods 
Precision instruments
148 176 195 213 232 251 272 289 315 345
and optical equipment 138 159 171 179 197 214 232 269 299 329
Woodworking 126 147 161 173 186 186 196 207 219 239
Textiles 120 133 139 142 146 147 150 158 167 178
Clothing 132 146 149 163 177 161 167 174 183 188
Leather goods 120 137 145 154 163 162 168 178 188 197
Pulp and paper 119 129 135 142 147 150 158 164 172 182
Polygraphic 120 132 142 147 147 149 158 162 167 175
Glass and ceramics 115 129 140 147 156 162 177 189 198 212
Food industries 122 127 138 144 144 150 157 165 171 179
oto
SOURCE: German Democratic Republic. Staatlichen Zentralverwaltung fUr Statistik, Statistisches
Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1966, (East Berlin: Staatsverlag der Deutschen
Demokratischen Republik, 1966), pp. 152-153. Referred to hereafter as SJBDDR followed by date. 
SJBDDR, 1968, pp. 152-153.
TABLE B-4
GROSS OUTPUT OF EAST GERMAN INDUSTRY: 
(MILLIONS OF MDN)
1958-1967
Industry 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965* 1966 1967
Mining 2616 2700 2626 2730 2872 2980 3089 3109 3086 3224
Metallurgy 4415 4897 5409 5705 5912 5984 6340 6666 6990 7332
Chemicals 8777 9747 10470 11302 12176 12982 14066 15306 16679 17846
Building materials 1108 1272 1392 1492 1559 1567 1801 1896 1990 2076
Electrotechnical 3964 4779 5501 5923 6755 7182 7851 8540 9454 10159
Machinery 5871 7089 7910 8715 9608 10078 10876 11565 12222 13069
Metal goods 
Precision instruments
1313 1562 1728 1892 2058 2230 2411 2565 2795 3062
and optical equipment 1162 1337 1438 1508 1657 1802 1950 2263 2515 2767
Woodworking 2050 2384 2607 2801 3024 3020 3185 3357 3552 3876
Textiles 5649 6256 6534 6671 6881 6911 7059 7452 7855 8373
Clothing 1963 2178 2219 2428 2637 2401 2490 2596 2730 2804
Leather goods 1199 1370 1452 1543 1628 1616 1677 1780 1880 1970
Pulp and paper 1015 1105 1157 1215 1261 1281 1350 1405 1473 1559
Polygraphic 545 601 655 668 670 679 717 738 761 797
Glass and ceramics 738 831 899 948 1003 1041 1137 1217 1275 1365
Food industries 8901 9300 10129 10526 10529 10963 11518 12082 12522 13107
SOURCE: SJBDDR, 1962, pp. 282-283; SJBDDR, 1965, pp. 150-151; Appendix Table B-3.




RATIO OF WEST GERMAN NET OUTPUT TO GROSS OUTPUT: 1962
Industry Net Output (NO) Gross Output (GO) NO/GO
Mining 10779 16004 0.674
Metallurgy 13776 32936 0.417
Chemicals 22708 43846 0.518
Building materials 6846 10421 0.657
Electrotechnical 14226 25622 0.557
Shipbuilding 1090 2600 0.419
Machinery 22499 40443 0.556
Metal goods 9057 16344 0.554
Precision instruments
and optical equipment 2021 3131 0.646
Woodworking 5967 11579 0.515
Textiles 8393 18398 0.456
Clothing 4691 10347 0.453
Leather goods 2294 4859 0.472
Pulp and paper 3809 8033 0.474
Polygraphic 3965 5941 0.667
Glass and ceramics 2781 4237 0.656
Food industries 19832 45503 0.436
SOURCE: Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt,
"Industrie und Handwerk, Fachserie D," Zenzus im Produzierenden Gewerbe 
1962 (Stuttgart und Mainz: U. Kohlehammer, GmbH, 1966), pp. 125-127.
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CALCULATION OF ESTIMATED NET OUTPUT SERIES 
FOR EAST GERMAN INDUSTRY
Since the East German authorities do not publish time series 
on net output by industry, estimates of net output by industry were 
computed. The Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung or DIW 
in Berlin computed the ratio of gross output of East German industry 
to gross output of West German industry. Where possible the DIW 
used physical output to confute these ratios. The DIW study used 
1967 as the base year. The ratio of East to West gross output was 
multiplied by West German gross output in 1962, and gross output for 
East German industry was then extended by use of the gross output 
indexes presented in Table B-3. Similar gross output figures for 
West German industry were created by extending West German gross
1
output series back by use of the index of net output by industry.
The use of gross output series did not seem desirable for 
purposes of estimating a production function because of the problem 
of double counting. The approach used was to impose the West German 
ratio of net output to gross output on East German industry and then 
to construct an estimated net output series by industry. Such an 
approach has certain disadvantages. The obvious disadvantage is 
that nothing happens to the rate of change of output from year to
1
Federal Republic of Germany. Bundesministerium fUr innerdeutsche 
Beziehungen, Bericht der Bundesregierung und Materialien zur Lage der 
Nation 1971, (Kassel: A. G. Wenderoth, 1971), p. 106.
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year. Stolper points out that the whole concept of gross output
is undesirable because it is possible for gross output to increase
without any corresponding increase in real output. If there are
two products, X and and there are more stages of production in
producing x than in producing y_, then a shift from %  to x would
cause gross output to increase because the number of double countings
increases. Simply increasing the stages of production— a likely
occurrence as an economy develops— gives an upward bias to gross
2
output statistics. Nothing can be done about this problem since 
there is no reliable method of separating out inter-industry flows, 
given East German data reporting.
The advantage of constructing net output series is that the 
share of labor in output is more accurately represented. The contri­
bution of labor to gross output is substantially smaller than its 
contribution to estimated net output. While there is some uncertainty 
as to the validity of imposing West German net output to gross 
output ratios on East German industry, the disadvantages of using 
the gross output method for industries in both countries seemed 
greater. In addition the upward bias in the East German industrial 
statistics gives the East German economic system the benefit of 
any doubts about its performance vis a vis the West German system.
As discussed above, the DIW used 1967 as the year for computing 
gross output ratios and then applied these ratios to West German
2Wolfgang F. Stolper, The Structure of the East German Economy, 
(Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 71-72.
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gross output in 1962. The DIW method was to compute the coefficient 
of production in each East German industry to production in each 
West German industry from a sample of physical units. This coeffi­
cient was then multiplied by the value of West German gross output 
to get East German gross output in West German marks. Such a 
procedure does provide an excellent method of comparison of gross 
output. To get estimates of net output, however, it would still 
be necessary to compute the coefficient of West German net output 
to West German gross output and then apply this ratio to the resulting 
estimate of East German gross output. This procedure was in fact 
carried out by Herbert Wilkins in an earlier DIW study. Wilkins 
points out that because of the similarity of the assortment of
3
goods produced, the amount of distortion does not seem excessive.
Herbert Wilkins, "Labor Productivity in East and West German 
Industry," Economic Bulletin, Vol. 7 (June 1970), pp. 53-56.
TABLE B-6
EAST GERMAN INDUSTRY: ESTIMATED NET OUTPUT: 1958-1967
(MILLIONS OF MDN)
Industry 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Mining 1763 1820 1770 1840 1936 2008 2082 2096 2080 2173
Metallurgy 1841 2042 2256 2379 2465 2495 2644 2780 2915 3058
Chemicals 4546 5049 5424 5855 6307 6725 7286 7929 8640 9244
Building materials 728 836 915 980 1024 1030 1183 1245 1307 1364
Electrotechnical 2208 2662 3064 3299 3763 4000 4373 4757 5266 5658
Shipbuilding 401 504 564 508 526 580 649 725 722 777
Machinery 3264 3941 4398 4845 5342 5603 6047 6430 6796 7266
Metal goods 
Precision instruments
727 865 957 1048 1140 1236 1336 1421 1549 1696
and optical equipment 751 864 957 974 1071 1164 1260 1462 1625 1788
Woodworking 1056 1228 1342 1442 1557 1555 1640 1729 1829 1996
Textiles 2576 2853 2979 3042 3138 3152 3219 3389 3582 3818
Clothing 889 987 1005 1100 1195 1088 1128 1176 1237 1270
Leather goods 566 647 686 728 769 763 791 840 887 930
Pulp and paper 481 524 548 576 598 607 640 666 698 739
Polygraphic 364 401 437 445 447 453 479 492 508 532
Glass and ceramics 484 545 590 622 658 683 746 799 837 896
Food industries 3881 4055 4416 4589 4591 4780 5022 5268 5459 5715
o00
SOURCE: Appendix Tables B-4 and B-3.
APPENDIX C 
EAST AND WEST GERMAN CAPITAL STOCK 
TABLE C-1
GROSS CAPITAL STOCK OF WEST GERMAN INDUSTRY IN 1962 PRICES:
(MILLIONS OF DM)
1958-1967
Industry 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Mining 23447 24661 25619 26467 27086 27342 27542 27735 27404 26673
Metallurgy 20889 22201 23543 25343 27544 29661 31577 33270 34692 35760
Chemicals 28422 30434 32732 35381 37966 40538 43290 46483 50532 54326
Building materials 5465 5972 6735 7722 8774 9707 10647 11760 12777 13462
Electrotechnical 9300 10204 11259 12565 14017 15381 16600 17827 19087 20236
Shipbuilding 2999 2154 2249 2312 2370 2420 2488 2580 2660 2726
Machinery 15482 16546 17904 19709 21610 23252 24746 26443 28154 29531
Metal goods 
Precision Instruments
5129 5606 6241 7005 7757 8051 9250 10046 10830 11494
and optical equipment 1361 1475 1609 1753 1904 2065 2213 2365 2524 2681
Woodworking 4159 4477 4861 5278 5719 6174 6610 7071 7554 7976
Textiles 9646 10248 10998 11867 12616 13225 13816 14507 15209 15765
Clothing 1868 2051 2254 2480 2696 2894 3094 3319 3547 3708
Leather goods 1553 1634 1728 1839 1935 2012 2092 2180 2253 2299
Pulp and paper 4044 4412 4828 5305 5845 6372 6795 7209 7677 8196
Polygraphic 2914 3234 3629 4000 4337 4696 5043 5383 5720 6065
Glass and ceramics 1798 2160 2371 2632 2899 3139 3338 3690 3996 4215
Food Industries 18179 19447 20989 22580 24143 25764 27469 29194 30918 32678
oVO
SOURCE: Krengel et al., Produktionsvolumen 1968, p. 32.
TABLE C-2
RATIO OF ACTUAL TO POTENTIAL NET OUTPUT OF WEST GERMAN INDUSTRY: 1958-1967
Industry 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Mining 0.987 0.920 0.918 0.910 0.906 0.923 0.944 0.918 0.891 0.857
Metallurgy 0.829 0.862 0.962 0.907 0.820 0.741 0.832 0.795 0.748 0.744
Chemicals 0.922 0.949 0.981 0.950 0.945 0.937 0.964 0.957 0.930 0.883
Building materials 0.883 0.960 0.954 0.941 0.924 0.897 0.964 0.922 0.902 0.845
Electrotechnical 0.867 0.870 0.943 0.944 0.873 0.817 0.838 0.876 0.812 0.754
Shipbuilding 1.000 0.873 0.845 0.816 0.765 0.702 0.752 0.788 0.810 0.807
Machinery 0.879 0.873 0.953 0.982 0.935 0.877 0.908 0.935 0.894 0.811
Metal goods 
Precision Instruments
0.862 0.894 0.961 0.917 0.861 0.836 0.887 0.898 0.838 0.758
and optical equipment 0.945 0.955 1.000 0.957 0.889 0.845 0.924 0.936 0.893 0.818
Woodworking 0.935 0.944 0.978 0.955 0.940 0.870 0.919 0.933 0.911 0.848
Textiles 0.896 0.929 0.979 0.949 0.933 0.916 0.923 0.932 0.902 0.822
Clothing 0.937 0.940 0.949 0.957 0.952 0.918 0.932 0.972 0.951 0.835
Leather goods 0.893 0.925 0.934 0.927 0.921 0.922 0.940 0.954 0.912 0.818
Pulp and paper 0.982 0.980 1.000 0.939 0.914 0.884 0.911 0.925 0.910 0.867
Polygraphic 0.973 0.940 0.937 0.928 0.913 0.885 0.890 0.901 0.893 0.854
Glass and ceramics 0.941 0.943 0.984 0.947 0.921 0.889 0.927 0.935 0.894 0.819
Food Industries 0.975 0.967 0.964 0.961 0.970 0.965 0.977 0.978 0.965 0.946
SOURCE: Appendix Tables B-1 and B-2.
TABLE C-3
ESTIMATED UTILIZED CAPITAL STOCK IN WEST GERMAN INDUSTRY:
(MILLIONS OF DM)
1958-1967
Industry 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Mining 23150 22692 23512 24092 24543 25240 25996 25466 24425 22856
Metallurgy 17327 19141 22640 22985 22575 21993 26274 26454 25955 26588
Chemicals 26201 28867 32110 33626 35896 37996 41752 44491 46848 47967
Building materials 4829 5735 6423 7266 8106 8708 10266 10844 11523 11378
Electrotechnical 8061 8882 10620 11860 12234 12568 13914 15621 15501 15252
Shipbuilding 2999 1880 1900 1886 1814 1699 1872 2034 2155 2200
Machinery 13607 14449 17069 19357 20204 20402 22457 24725 25160 23958
Metal goods 
Precision instruments
4421 5013 5999 6424 6677 6731 8201 9019 9079 8714
and optical equipment 1286 1409 1609 1677 1693 1745 2045 2214 2253 2193
Woodworking 3889 4225 4753 5039 5378 5371 6074 6596 6885 6766
Textiles 8645 9524 10767 11266 11766 12113 12757 13518 13724 12955
Clothing 1750 1928 2139 2374 2566 2656 2283 3227 3374 3095
Leather goods 1387 1511 1614 1705 1783 1854 1967 2079 2055 1880
Pulp and paper 3871 4326 4831 4983 5344 5634 6191 6668 6983 7109
Polygraphic 2835 3040 3401 3710 3959 4157 4489 4851 5110 5182
Glass and ceramics 1692 2037 2334 2492 2671 2791 3094 3049 3571 3453
Food industries 17728 18803 20232 21704 23410 24863 26845 28553 29848 30911
SOURCE: Appendix Tables C-1 and C-2. The formula used was = Q^/Qp (K^) where is the utilized
capital stock, and are actual and potential output respectively, and is actual capital stock.
TABLE C-4
GROSS CAPITAL STOCK IN EAST GERMAN INDUSTRY IN 1962 PRICES: 1958-1967
(MILLIONS OF MDN)
Industry 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Mining 9870 10740 12010 13280 14340 15460 16940 18500 20060 20860
Metallurgy 6170 6350 6450 6540 6920 7420 8010 8650 9570 9980
Chemicals 14320 14760 15330 15980 16770 17630 19350 20460 22440 22970
Building materials 2810 3000 3340 3700 4090 4410 4780 4940 5040 5200
Electrotechnical 2420 2550 2700 2910 3160 3490 3850 4100 4490 4810
Shipbuilding 830 830 840 870 900 990 1020 1060 1060 1100
Machinery 6530 6880 7220 7710 8140 8460 9120 9590 10350 10780
Metal goods 
Precision instruments
1250 1290 1350 1420 1590 1710 1840 1940 2070 2110
and optical equipment 1090 1120 1160 1200 1240 1330 1440 1600 1760 1810
Woodworking 1890 1940 2080 2160 2220 2340 2530 2720 2850 2910
Textiles 5880 6000 6230 6480 6700 6930 7300 7520 7810 7880
Clothing 370 380 400 430 470 490 520 540 560 590
Leather goods 1070 1100 1120 1150 1210 1230 1290 1260 1310 1320
Pulp and paper 2320 2360 2410 2450 2650 2820 2990 3090 3200 3220
Polygraphic 610 650 670 720 720 800 830 860 890 910
Glass and ceramics 1320 1380 1420 1500 1570 1730 1920 2080 2250 2350
Food industries 7740 7790 8030 8250 8490 8910 9620 9230 9680 9750
H*to
SOURCE: Manfred Meltzer, "Das Anlagevermügen der mltteldeutschen Industrie 1955 bis 1966,"
Vlertelsjahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung (Erstes Heft, 1968), p. 110; DIW, DDR Wirtschaft. (Frankfurt 
am Main: Fischer Bucherei, GmbH, 1971), pp. 271-272.
APPENDIX D
LABOR INPUTS FOR EAST AND WEST GERMAN INDUSTRY
TABLE D-1
MANHOURS IN WEST GERMAN INDUSTRY; 1958-1967 
(MILLIONS OF MANHOURS)
Industry 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Mining 1379 1248 1156 1092 1015 955 915 854 766 643
Metallurgy 1332 1324 1408 1432 1347 1298 1331 1343 1252 1147
Chemicals 1275 1341 1422 1456 1463 1468 1514 1566 1581 1513
Building materials 565 587 592 595 590 573 597 590 569 506
Electrotechnical 1481 1530 1684 1774 1743 1716 1738 1791 1749 1589
Shipbuilding 236 213 208 199 187 167 165 164 160 152
Machinery 2347 2341 2515 2598 2592 2522 2536 2618 2577 2339
Metal goods 
Precision instruments
1027 1062 1111 1117 1074 1064 1075 1092 1061 956
and optical equipment 297 294 310 311 293 283 287 286 280 269
Woodworking 800 778 778 775 755 718 716 717 704 648
Textiles 1228 1197 1217 1170 1108 1055 1028 1004 977 874
Clothing 664 661 679 686 694 689 687 695 689 620
Leather goods 377 357 353 340 328 317 313 306 292 267
Pulp and paper 398 399 419 416 415 413 409 408 405 380
Polygraphic 395 396 395 404 413 410 410 411 411 401
Glass and ceramics 375 374 376 373 359 339 337 338 331 304
Food industries 1100 1095 1097 1093 1100 1097 1083 1070 1062 1034
SOURCE: Krengel et al., Produktionsvolumen 1968, p. 21.
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CALCULATION OF EAST GERMAN MANHOURS
East Germany does not provide manhour series, only employment 
series. From other information it seemed plausible to create an 
estimated manhour input series indirectly from four separate data 
series provided on an industry basis. These series were hours per 
1000 MDN of gross output produced by production workers in socialist 
industry, production workers, gross production in socialist industry, 
and total workers employed. All series are for each industry.
The first step was to calculate total production worker input in 
millions of manhours. This was set up in the form
where MR is total manhours of production workers in socialist industry, 
is the number of hours needed to produce one East mark (MDN) of
gross output in socialist industry by a production worker, and 2g is
gross output in socialist industry.
The next step was to divide total production worker manhours by
production workers to get manhours per production worker per year in
socialist industry. Then the manhours per production worker per year 
can be multiplied by total employment. This procedure in effect 
converts all workers into socialist production worker equivilants and 
allows an estimate of total manhours worker in each industry.
TABLE D-2
ESTIMATED MANHOURS IN EAST GERMAN INDUSTRY;
(MILLIONS OF MANHOURS)
1958-1967
Industry 1958® 1959® 1960^ 1961® 1962% 1963^ 1964^ 1965^ 1966*= 1967'
Mining 425 426 396 388 390 400 402 399 396 375
Metallurgy 260 268 308 308 300 298 308 355 376 368
Chemicals 483 526 536 529 532 536 558 570 567 555
Building materials 181 184 187 181 180 172 180 180 180 178
Electrotechnical 393 416 419 417 434 448 455 482 480 483
Shipbuilding 81 81 81 75 75 78 82 84 80 83
Machinery 684 714 722 762 767 769 794 820 830 837
Metal goods 
Precision instruments
170 173 173 167 172 178 175 180 178 181
and optical equipment 185 192 192 185 187 190 196 214 211 219
Woodworking 298 301 303 298 295 306 292 291 288 283
Textiles 669 645 642 610 586 587 575 559 545 524
Clothing 231 231 229 222 218 222 226 225 220 214
Leather goods 132 135 134 130 126 126 128 129 129 129
Pulp and paper 125 125 125 123 121 122 121 118 118 112
Polygraphic 119 123 120 117 118 117 115 114 112 109
Glass and ceramics 130 132 132 126 127 124 133 133 130 132
Food industries 423 422 428 429 400 408 415 400 398 402
SOURCE: SJBDDR. various years.
^SJBDDR. 1962, pp. 276-277, 282-283, 317-319.
^SJBDDR. 1965, pp. 150-152, 180-181, 184-186.
^SJBDDR. 1968, pp. 150-152, 180-181, 184-186.
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APPENDIX E
CROSS SECTION ESTIMATES OF THE COBB-DOUGLAS 
AND CES PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS FOR EAST AND WEST GERMANY
TABLE E-1
CROSS SECTION ESTIMATES OF THE COBB-DOUGLAS 
PRODUCTION FUNCTION FOR EAST GERMAN INDUSTRY BY YEAR














































Year log A a r 2 F* SER
1967 1.746
(0.305)
0 .1 2 9b
(0.108)
0.026 0.400 0.313




Critical value for F = 4.54 at the 5 percent level of slgnifi-15
Not significant at the 5 percent level of significance.
118
TABLE E-2
CES CROSS-SECTION ESTIMATES OF THE ELASTICITY
OF SUBSTITUTION FOR EAST GERMAN INDUSTRY BY YEAR




















































SOURCE: Appendix Tables B-6, D-2, and G-2; and equation (4-7).
^Critical value for F^ ^5 is 4.54 at the 5 percent level of significance. 
^Critical value for T^g is 2.131 at the 5 percent level of significance. 
^Not significant at the 5 percent level of significance.
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TABLE E-3
CROSS-SECTION ESTIMATES OF THE COBB-DOUGLAS
PRODUCTION FUNCTION FOR WEST GERMAN INDUSTRY BY YEAR
Year log A a aF SER
1958 1.280 0.336 0.486 14.183 0.201
(0.174) (0.084)
1959 1.230 0.384 0.584 21.058 0.180
(0.169) (0.079)
1960 1.272 0.380 0.549 18.259 0.190
(0.188) (0.084)
1961 1.193 0.439 0.676 31.296 0.179
(0.176) (0.075)
1962 1.198 0.438 0.616 24.063 0.189
(0.200) (0.085)
1963 1.182 0.453 0.630 25.541 0.192
(0.206) (0.085)
1964 1.300 0.406 0.524 16.513 0.189
(0.230) (0.094)
1965 1.249 0.448 0.616 24.062 0.185
(0.223) (0.086)
1966 1.218 0.464 0.641 26.783 0.185
(0.225) (0.086)
1967 1.139 0.502 0.706 36.020 0.183
(0.217) (0.080)
SOURCE: Appendix Tables B-1, C-3, and D-1; and equation (4-6).




CES CROSS-SECTION ESTIMATES OF THE ELASTICITY
OF SUBSTITUTION FOR WEST GERMAN INDUSTRY BY YEAR
Year B^ = S R^ F* T value for B^ 
different from 
one


















































SOURCE: Appendix Tables B-1, D-1, and G-1; and equation (4-3).
^Critical value for Fĵ  = 4.54 at 5 percent level of significance 
^Critical value for T^^ = 2.131 at 5 percent level of significance. 
^Not significantly different from zero.
APPENDIX F
THE HICKS NEUTRAL SHIFT FACTOR A(t) FOR EAST AND WEST GERMANY
TABLE F-1
THE HICKS NEUTRAL SHIFT FACTOR A(t) IN WEST GERMAN INDUSTRY: 1958-1967
Industry 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Mining 1.000 1.024 1.063 1.089 1.120 1.151 1.175 1.187 1.212 1.255
Metallurgy 1.000 1.027 1.057 1.040 1.042 1.030 1.090 1.093 1.081 1.119
Chemicals 1.000 1.084 1.145 1.196 1.266 1.338 1.418 1.434 1.554 1.638
Building materials 1.000 0.998 0.985 0.978 0.971 0.959 0.955 0.933 0.922 0.913
Electrotechnical 1.000 1.022 1.054 1.075 1.090 0.104 1.144 1.184 1.236 1.273
Shipbuilding 1.000 1.150 1.161 1.170 1.172 1.196 1.268 1.332 1.390 1.434
Machinery 1.000 0.991 0.995 0.999 0.985 0.970 0.980 0.979 0.964 0.957
Metal goods 
Precision instruments
1.000 1.003 1.021 1.011 1.009 1.038 1.025 1.024 1.006 1.001
and optical equipment 1.000 1.027 1.044 1.041 1.056 1.069 1.129 1.153 1.153 1.139
Woodworking 1.000 1.024 1.049 1.053 1.075 1.079 1.119 1.139 1.150 1.163
Textiles 1.000 1.046 1.078 1.099 1.128 1.148 1.169 1.192 1.195 1.203
Clothing 1.000 1.013 1.016 1.027 1.038 1.031 1.043 1.063 1.060 1.045
Leather goods 1.000 1.026 1.024 1.029 1.032 1.035 1.040 1.047 1.035 1.007
Pulp and paper 1.000 1.018 1.027 1.026 1.037 1.042 1.065 1.079 1.083 1.094
Polygraphic 1.000 1.007 1.034 1.040 1.040 1.045 1.060 1.075 1.080 1.080
Glass and ceramics 1.000 0.949 0.974 0.977 0.996 1.013 1.050 1.051 1.047 1.041




Appendix Tables B-1, C-3, and D-1, The A(t) series is computed from equations (3-8)
TABLE F-2
THE KICKS NEUTRAL SHIFT FACTOR A(t) IN EAST GERMAN INDUSTRY: 1958-1967
Industry 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Mining 1.000 1.023 1.062 1.117 1.156 1.160 1.183 1.183 1.173 1.283
Metallurgy 1.000 1.076 1.096 1.148 1.178 1.158 1.162 1.094 1.062 1.105
Chemicals 1.000 1.055 1.100 1.164 1.214 1.248 1.254 1.305 1.287 1.416
Building materials 1.000 1.120 1.181 1.258 1.284 1.289 1.399 1.453 1.514 1.566
Electrotechnical 1.000 1.141 1.276 1.329 1.426 1.412 1.450 1.485 1.562 1.606
Shipbuilding 1.000 1.255 1.405 1.292 1.322 1.367 1.467 1.598 1.632 1.680
Machinery 1.000 1.154 1.259 1.310 1.411 1.454 1.491 1.523 1.545 1.614
Metal goods 
Precision instruments
1.000 1.165 1.271 1.392 1.418 1.463 1.511 1.543 1.640 1.762
and optical equipment 1.000 1.112 1.184 1.262 1.366 1.435 1.479 1.561 1.683 1.790
Woodworking 1.000 1.150 1.228 1.327 1.429 1.370 1.448 1.488 1.550 1.700
Textiles 1.000 1.129 1.167 1.214 1.298 1.285 1.300 1.375 1.451 1.576
Clothing 1.000 1.100 1.106 1.210 1.287 1.138 1.140 1.174 1.232 1.254
Leather goods 1.000 1.116 1.180 1.268 1.332 1.313 1.325 1.411 1.466 1.533
Pulp and paper 1.000 1.079 1.127 1.190 1.224 1.213 1.262 1.318 1.371 1.498
Polygraphic 1.000 1.055 1.157 1.165 1.161 1.133 1.191 1.211 1.244 1.308
Glass and ceramics 1.000 1.106 1.192 1.283 1.290 1.325 1.337 1.393 1.446 1.503





Appendix Tables B-6, C-4, and D-2. The A(t) series is computed from equations (3-8)
APPENDIX G
THE TOTAL REAL WAGE PAYMENTS FOR EAST AND WEST GERMANY
TABLE G-1
THE TOTAL REAL WAGE PAYMENTS IN WEST GERMAN INDUSTRY: 1958-1967
(MILLIONS OF DM)
Industry 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Mining 5318 4848 4714 4834 4810 4725 4717 4897 4420 3932
Metallurgy 4518 4640 5402 5901 6043 5993 6468 6928 6658 6409
Chemicals 4092 4535 5205 5876 6434 6938 7668 8242 9066 9007
Building materials 1518 1656 1817 2007 2171 2245 2481 2595 2610 2372
Electrotechnical 4093 4443 5308 6059 6624 6797 7335 8154 8461 8255
Shipbuilding 680 645 687 718 755 691 738 784 809 831
Machinery 6674 7020 8217 9288 10244 10362 11158 13074 12860 12172
Metal goods 
Precision instruments
2695 2851 3282 3611 3854 3975 4295 4689 4793 4454
and optical equipment 747 778 893 972 1018 1033 1121 1208 1255 1255
Woodworking 1794 1836 1732 2215 2366 2423 2571 2760 2881 2738
Textiles 3187 2957 3344 3525 3601 3648 3744 3870 3927 3652
Clothing 1293 1355 1532 1750 1937 2032 2145 2329 2447 2247
Leather goods 834 847 933 997 1028 1066 1114 1186 1184 1098
Pulp and paper 968 1036 1200 1318 1431 1507 1601 1701 1794 1747
Polygraphic 1096 1175 1259 1413 1557 1656 1771 1919 2053 2068
Glass and ceramics 928 970 1073 1178 1274 1258 1343 1437 1492 1425
Food industries 2651 2821 3087 3385 3714 3947 4156 4375 4606 4662
tSJW
SOURCE: Rolf Krengel, et al., ProduktIonsvolumen 1968, p. 40; Statistlsches Bundesamt, Statistlsches
Jahrbuch ftlr die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1971 (Wiesbaden: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1971), p. 443.
TABLE G-2
THE TOTAL REAL WAGE PAYMENTS IN EAST GERMAN INDUSTRY:
(MILLIONS OF MDN)
1958-1967
Industry 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Mining 1612 1745 1615 1649 1671 1725 1810 1873 1867 1852
Metallurgy 994 1050 1259 1332 1323 1332 1396 1511 1544 1596
Chemicals 1554 1894 2018 2056 2084 2131 2253 2421 2469 2522
Building materials 570 633 670 683 663 650 686 714 727 744
Electrotechnical 1302 1459 1523 1595 1635 1707 1818 1945 2005 2092
Shipbuilding 293 325 327 310 303 323 337 358 355 373
Machinery 2404 2679 2807 3046 3062 3147 3287 3526 3597 3758
Metal goods 492 560 571 594 614 638 654 694 710 733
Precision instruments
and optical equipment 575 641 661 677 685 715 763 855 886 948
Woodworking 822 941 986 1024 1022 993 1008 1025 1042 1064
Textiles 1687 1847 1921 1933 1903 1877 1859 1912 1891 1892
Clothing 556 653 677 689 692 643 655 675 679 686
Leather goods 363 412 433 433 424 417 432 453 461 465
Pulp and paper 331 388 407 417 413 412 423 437 442 445
Polygraphic 254 265 269 266 260 254 259 265 266 272
Glass and ceramics 383 430 472 471 469 479 506 523 524 543
Food industries 1110 1250 1342 1385 1339 1358 1394 1432 1487 1556
SOURCE: SJBDDR. 1962, pp. 336-337; SJBDDR. 1968, pp. 190-•191: SJBDDR. 1969, p. 354.
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APPENDIX H
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR CES, COBB-DOUGLAS,
AND CMS PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS
TABLE H-1
CES ESTIMATES FOR EAST GERMAN INDUSTRY: FERGUSON MODEL*





































































































































SOURCE: Appendix Tables B-6, C-4, and D-2; and equation (4-7).
^The number of observations is ten.
^Not significant at the 5 percent level of significance.
^Not significantly different from one at the 5 percent level of 
significance.
Standard errors are given in parentheses.
127
TABLE H-2
CES ESTIMATES FOR WEST GERMAN INDUSTRY: FERGUSON MODEL®





























































0 .2 7 9b
(0.631)













































0 .6 8 4b
(0.426)













0 .1 8 4b
(0.125)
0.997 1163.167 -6.520
SOURCE: Appendix Tables B-1, C-3, and D-1; and equation (4-7).
^The number of observations is ten.
^Not significant at the 5 percent level of significance, 
cNot significantly different from one at the 5 percent level of 
significance.
^Standard errors are given in parentheses.
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TABLE H-3
COBB-DOUGLAS ESTIMATES FOR EAST GERMAN INDUSTRY®
Industry log c" ba r 2 F






























































































Industry log B^ cb ab r 2 F




























SOURCE: Appendix Tables B-6, C-4, and D-2; and equation (4-1)
^The number of observations is ten.
^Standard errors are given in parentheses.
^Not significant at the 5 percent level of significance.
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TABLE H-4
COBB-DOUGLAS ESTIMATES FOR WEST GERMAN INDUSTRY^































































































Industry log cb ba r2 F




























SOURCE; Appendix Tables B-1 
^The number of observations
, C-3, and 
is ten.
D-1; and equation (4-1).
^Standard errors are given in parentheses.
^Not significant at the 5 percent level of significance. 
*̂ The standard error is less than 0.0001.
TABLE H-5
CES ESTIMATES FOR EAST GERMAN INDUSTRY: KMENTA MODEL*
(OUTPUT NOT DEFLATED FOR TECHNICAL CHANGE)











































































Industry blog B dt (1 - d)b pvd(l - d)^ F
Precision instruments 




















































































SOURCE: Appendix Tables B-6, C-4, and D-2; and equation (4-2).
^The number of observations is ten. 
bStandard errors are given in parentheses.
wLn
TABLE H-6
CES ESTIMATES FOR WEST GERMAN INDUSTRY : KMENTA MODEL® 
(OUTPUT NOT DEFLATED FOR TECHNICAL CHANGE)
Industry blog B
b






























































































































































Appendix Tables B-1, C-3, and D-1; and equation (4-2).




CES ESTIMATES FOR WEST GERMAN INDUSTRY: KMENTA MODEL^
(OUTPUT DEFLATED FOR TECHNICAL CHANGE)
Industry
blog B db (1 - d)b pd(l - d)^ r 2 F
Mining -0.014 0.756 0.218 0.029 0.997 664.667
(0.188) (0.128) (0.149) (0.046)
Metallurgy 0.039 1.225 -0.264 -0.233 0.999 1998.000
(0.212) (0.228) (0.249) (0.081)
Chemicals 2.871 -2.002 3.273 0.795 0.995 398.000
(2.884) (2.272) (2.408) (0.686)
Building materials 0.387 0.102 -0.032 -0.158 0.999 1998.000
(0.255) (0.157) (0.207) (0.061)
Electrotechnical 0.325 0.666 0.371 0.111 0.999 1998.000
(0.074) (0.175) (0.197) (0.087)
Shipbuilding 0.955 0.414 0.550 -0.039 0.999 1998.000
(0.187) (0.151) (0.151) (0.063)
Machinery 0.792 2.261 -1.451 -0.842 0.976 81.082
(1.051) (1.265) (1.414) (0.613)
Metal goods 0.593 1.212 -0.231 -0.317 0.992 248.000
(0.871) (0.464) (0.591) (0.254)
w•00
TABLE H-7— Continued
Industry log d (1 - d) pd(l - d) F
Precision Instruments 




















































































SOURCE: Appendix Tables B-1, C-3, D-1, and F-1; and equation (4-11).
^The number of observations is ten.
^Standard errors are given in parentheses. g
TABLE H-8
CES ESTIMATES FOR EAST GERMAN INDUSTRY: KMENTA MODEL^
(OUTPUT DEFLATED FOR TECHNICAL CHANGE)
Industry log B^ dt (1 - d)^ pd(l - d)^ r 2 F
Mining 1.996 0.176 0.602 0.044 0.918 22.390
(2,738) (0.757) (0.701) (0.208)
Metallurgy 12.669 -7.253 8.287 2.423 0.857 11.945
(34,132) (21.279) (21.179) (6.746)
Chemicals -15.362 6.013 -4.177 -1.377 0.968 60.500
(11.648) (6.732) (6.819) (1.904)
Building materials -8.215 -1.180 4.143 0.707 0.982 109.111
(3.628) (1.589) (1.690) (0.519)
Electrotechnical -10.353 5.940 -4.035 -2.448 0.965 55.143
(4.962) (3.413) (3.749) (1.630)
Shipbuilding -7.636 2.229 -0.099 -0.273 0.754 6.130
(40.335) (30.353) (29.668) (12.397)
Machinery -29.897 18.095 -15.720 -7.186 0.980 98.000
(8.106) (8.364) (8.833) (3.372)
Metal goods -5.489 5.140 -4.109 -1.697 0.946 35.037
(9.677) (4.496) (4.235) (2.044)
TABLE H-8— Continued
Industry log B*’ db (1 - d)b pd(l - d)b R: F
Precision instruments 





















































































SOURCE: Appendix Tables B-6, C-4, D-2, and F-1; and equation (4-11).
^The number of observations is ten.
^Standard errors are given in parentheses.
u>
TABLE H-9
CMS ESTIMATION FOR WEST GERMANY: ESTIMATES OF R AND SER
Industry SER Occurrence of maximum R
m=0.0 m=0.5 m=0.0 m=0.5 R^ m SER
Mining 0.9996 0.9996 0.0043 0.0041 0.9996 0.50 0.0041
Metallurgy 0.9981 0.9979 0.0058 0.0058 0.9981 0.00 0.0058
Chemicals 0.9987 0.9989 0.0113 0.0080 0.9991 1.00 0.0074
Building materials 0.9999 0.9998 0.0022 0.0028 0.9999 0.00 0.0022
Electrotechnical 0.9999 0.9996 0.0001 0.0030 0.9999 0.00 0.0001
Shipbuilding 0.9532 0.9522 0.0321 0.0302 0.9532 0.00 0.0321
Machinery 0.9999 0.9997 0.0008 0.0017 0.9999 0.00 0.0008
Metal goods 
Precision instruments
0.9907 0.9912 0.0154 0.0141 0.9916 1.00 0.0130
and optical equipment 0.9999 0.9999 0.0010 0.0014 0.9999 0.00 0.0010
Woodworking 0.9998 0.9994 0.0027 0.0046 0.9998 0.00 0.0027
Textiles 0.9497 0.9601 0.0465 0.0437 0.9601 0.50 0.0437
Clothing 0.9998 0.9999 0.0018 0.0012 0.9999 0.50 0.0012
Leather goods 0.9997 0.9996 0.0025 0.0027 0.9997 0.00 0.0025
Pulp and paper 0.9998 0.9999 0.0027 0.0017 0.9999 0.50 0.0017
Polygraphic 0.9999 0.9997 0.0011 0.0028 0.9999 0.00 0.0011
Glass and ceramics 0.9909 0.9908 0.0197 0.0187 0.9909 0.00 0.0197
Food industries 0.9999 0.9993 0.0016 0.0041 0.9999 0.00 0.0016
SOURCE: Appendix Tables B-1, C-3, and D-1; and equation (4-9),
TABLE H-10
CMS ESTIMATION FOR EAST GERMANY: ESTIMATES OF r 2 AND SER
Industry SER Occurrence of maximum R
m=0.0 m=0.5 m=0.0 m=0.5 R^ m SER
Mining 0.9665 0.9570 0.0281 0.0196 0.9665 0.00 0.0281
Metallurgy 0.3208 0.3214 0.0508 0.0477 0.3214 0.50 0.0508
Chemicals 0.9901 0.9876 0.0194 0.0203 0.9901 0.00 0.0194
Building materials 0.9870 0.9881 0.0242 0.0212 0.9891 1.00 0.0188
Electrotechnical 0.9702 0.9717 0.0402 0.0369 0.9730 1.00 0.0340
Shipbuilding 0.9111 0.9155 0.0569 0.0517 0.9195 1.00 0.0473
Machinery 0.9686 0.9702 0.0333 0.0301 0.9702 0.50 0.0301
Metal goods 
Precision instruments
0.9686 0.9713 0.0440 0.0389 0.9737 1.00 0.0347
and optical equipment 0.9931 0.9935 0.0191 0.0170 0.9936 1.00 0.0155
Woodworking 0.9463 0.9479 0.0471 0.0422 0.9488 1.00 0.0383
Textiles 0.9607 0.9613 0.0376 0.0341 0.9614 1.00 0.0313
Clothing 0.8562 0.8569 0.0509 0.0459 0.8576 1.00 0.0419
Leather goods 0.9433 0.9975 0.0391 0.0017 0.9975 0.50 0.0017
Pulp and paper 0.9801 0.9791 0.0230 0.0216 0.9801 0.00 0.0230
Polygraphic 0.9522 0.9531 0.0310 0.0271 0.9535 1.00 0.0242
Glass and ceramics 0.9787 0.9801 0.0282 0.0248 0.9815 1.00 0.0219
Food industries 0.9893 0.9894 0.0153 0.0146 0.9901 1.00 0.0136
Ln
SOURCE: Appendix Tables B-6, C-4, and D-2; and equation (4-9)
TABLE H-11
CMS ESTIMATES FOR WEST GERMAN INDUSTRY: PARAMETER ESTIMATES
AND TEST OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CMS PRODUCTION FUNCTION^
Industry A
c





1.00 0.9991 3885.389 3.689














0.50 0.9999 34996.500 3.500




0.50 0.9999 34996.500 4.118
SOURCE: Appendix Tables B-1, C-3, D-1, and H-9; and equation (4-9).
*See Table H-4 for m=0. the Cobb-Douglas case.
^The statistic g = (n - k) (SERgj -■ SERggig)/SERg^ is distributed as F with (1, n - k) degrees of
ft
freedom. The critical value for F ^  yj is 5.59 at the 5 percent level of significance. 




ESTIMATES FOR EAST GERMAN 



































0.50 0.9702 113.950 0.744




1.00 0.9737 129.580 1.876
Precision 
instruments and 




1.00 0.9936 543.375 1.626
TABLE H-12— Continued





1 . 0 0 0.9488 64.859 1.608
Textiles 3.86 0.046
(0.055)
0 . 1 0 0
(0.090)
1 . 0 0 0.9614 87.174 1.409
Clothing 3.15 -0.035
(0.032)
1 . 1 1 0
(0.521)
1 . 0 0 0.8576 21.079 1.504
Leather goods 2.33 0 . 0 0 1
(0 .0 0 1 )
0.341
(0.018)
0.50 0.9975 1396.500 154.000
Polygraphic 4.78 0.043
(0 .0 2 2 )
-0 . 1 1 1
(0.397)






1 . 0 0 0.9815 185.689 2.014




1 . 0 0 0.9901 350.035 0.875
SOURCE: Appendix Tables B-6 , C—4, D—2, and H-10; and equation (4-9).
®See Table H-3 for m=0, the Cobb-Douglas case. ^Standard errors are in parentheses.
^The statistic g = (n - k) (SER^^ - SER^^g)/SER^^ is distributed as F with (1, h - k) degrees of 
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